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There is an ongoing debate between political theorists
as to whether "realism" or "idealism" should guide the
formulation and implementation of America's foreign policy.
In general, policymakers have been characterized by one or
the other of these labels based upon a loose conception of
their overall policy objectives. Such generalities,
however, give inadequate weight to the fact that a
policymaker's most solemn commitment is to pursue the
national interest, regardless of any other personal
incl i nat i on
.
It is the hypothesis of this paper that the foreign
policy process is a pragmatic one, based on practical
assessments of the best and most likely methods of achieving
national objectives, rather than adherence to an underlying
commitment to realism or idealism. This paper demonstrates
this fact in a survey of significant instances in the
history of America's relations with Asia where presidents
and other senior officials were compelled to make pragmatic
foreign policy decisions despite reputations or personal
inclinations toward either realism or idealism.
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I
. INTRODUCTION
A. IDEALISM VERSUS REALISM IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
There is an ongoing argument between political theorists
over the basic values which should provide the focus for the
formulation of foreign policy. At the center of this
question is a debate between "idealists" who call for a
greater emphasis on morality in our policies, and "realists"
who insist that policy should be guided by material
interest .
The idealist position asserts that American foreign
policy has historically been, and should continue to be
based on principles that recognize equality between nations.
According to this view, all nations, large and small, weak
and strong are given equal status and endowed with juridical
equality, equal sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
Historian Frank Tannenbaum maintains these principles are a
part of an American tradition tracing back directly more
than 200 years - and indirectly much further. He explains
that our policy of international cooperation "derives from
the assumption that security rests upon cooperation, that
cooperation is possible only among equals, that equality
eliminates the basic reason for political disruption because
those equal politically are coordinate in dignity and in
rank." [Ref. 11 To those who might consider such notions
impractical and idealistic, Tannenbaum adds the caution:
"The fact that Germany and Japan have committed national
suicide by constant adhesion to the doctrines (of
Machiavelli, Richelieu, Bismark and Clemenceau) seems not to
dampen the eloquence of those who should persuade us to
abandon the beliefs and practices by which we have lived and
prospered from the beginning." [Ref. 2]
The realist position has probably been best articulated
by Hans Morganthau in a series of articles and books written
in the late 1940's and 1950's. Morganthau's thesis is that
power - primarily industrial and military power - is the
means by which nations survive in an essentially competitive
world, and that nations which neglect self-interest and
national power will ultimately succumb to the influence and
intimidation of other states which emphasize them. In his
article "The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The
National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions" [Ref. 31 he
argues
The fundamental error which has thwarted American
foreign policy in thought and action is the antithesis
of national interest and moral principles. The
equation of political moralism with morality and
political realism with immorality is itself untenable.
The choice is not between moral principles and the
national interest devoid of moral dignity, but between
one set of moral principles divorced from political
reality, and another set of moral principles derived
from political reality. The basic fact of
international politics is the absence of a society able
to protect the existence, and to promote the interests
of the individual nations. For the individual nations
to take care of their own national interests is, then,
a political necessity. There can be no moral duty to
neglect them, for as the international society is at
present constituted, the consistent neglect of the
national interest can only lead to national suicide.
There is also a third view which sees the debate not as
a question of "either/or", but as a problem of political
ethics. Here the problem involves a reconciliation of the
necessity for protecting the interests of the group which it
is the national leader's duty to serve, and the principle of
loyalty to a greater set of values such as justice and
equality. Reinhold Niebuhr accepts a certain amount of
validity in both the realist and idealist points of view,
but he suggests the possibility of a middle ground of
limited "moral transcendence" over sterile interest. While
nations cannot be expected to engage freely in generosity or
self-sacrifice, they are capable of what Niebuhr calls "wise
self-interest" based on the concurrence of their self-
interests and the interests of general welfare. "This
concurrence can be approximated only when interest is
qualified by a loyalty and sense of justice that are found
beyond interest, and when the components of interest which
still remain are acknowledged." [Ref. 4]
Henry Kissinger arrives at basically the same
conclusion, although approaching it from the opposite
direction. In his book American Foreign Policy , he states
that "principle, however lofty, must at some point be
related to practice... Interest is not necessarily amoral;
moral consequences can spring from interested acts." [Ref. 5]
When considering these differing perspectives, it can
be seen that the influence of both moral principles and
material interests on the formulation of American foreign
policy cannot be denied. But in fact, they are much more
compatible than the debate would suggest. It is only when
one of these is promoted to the total exclusion of the other
that a decision-maker betrays his mandate, for he is charged
with an overall responsibility to preserve, protect and
promote the nation, but to do so within the bounds of those
values most basic to its national existence.
The constant interplay between these two factors during
the foreign policy process keeps extreme actions within
bounds. Moral principles keep the pursuit of material
interests from becoming overly self-centered and
destructive, while the necessity of looking after self-
interest places a healthy perspective on idealism. Though
American foreign policy may at times seem inconsistent as it
wavers in response to these competing influences, the net
result is a continuum of balanced policy reflective of our
own national character.
B. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN EAST ASIA
In no other region of the world have American foreign
policies based, or apparently based, on morality and
idealism been overturned with more frequency for other, more
pragmatic approaches than in East Asia. An examination of
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the circumstances and the choices which faced policymakers
in these instances provides strong evidence that the
overriding factors in each policy decision were whether or
not the action contemplated was ultimately in the national
interest, and recognition of the fact that idealistic
principles can be followed only so long as the more basic
needs of the national interest are not jeopardized.
The region of East Asia itself is significant for
American foreign policy in a number of respects. In the
north it includes the point of convergence of what are
probably the four greatest powers of the world: the United
States, Soviet Union, Japan and China. Historically, this
convergence has fostered conflicts of interest between these
powers. When one also considers the other nations of the
region, economic investment as well as the potential for
conflict are also key factors for American policy in the
region as we work to try to maintain stability and improve
the human condition in the area.
C. PRAGMATISM - THE CONSTANT IN AMERICA'S ASIA POLICY
America's involvement with these nations is diverse and
of long standing. Since the very beginnings of the Republic
our interests in and policies toward East Asia have
developed in parallel with the evolution of an overall
American role in world affairs. And while specific goals of
U.S. East Asian policy may have become obscured from time to
1 1
time, they were never allowed to stray far from a central
theme. In their most simplified terms, these basic foreign
policy interests, not only in Asia, but in every other
region of the world as well, have been intended to
facilitate the creation of a global environment where
American trade could take place unencumbered, and where the
nation could exist in peace without threat to its security.
In tracing the evolution of American foreign policy in
East Asia, we can see that what might have appeared as
periodic deviations from the pursuit of the national
interest were, in fact, only temporary concessions to the
realities of the moment - pragmatic tactics and realignments
of priorities to achieve specific objectives, rather than a
total abandonment of basic interests. These actions
illustrate that there has been a good bit of Theodore
Roosevelt's and Henry Kissinger's kind of pragmatism present
in virtually every American leader who ever set out to mold
a foreign policy for East Asia. The pages that follow
detail specific instances where idealism came up short and
pragmatic approaches were adopted to settle complex Asian
policy problems, supporting the thesis that pragmatism is
the temperence of idealism with reality and the ultimate
fallback position of every foreign policymaker.
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II . ENLIGHTENED SELF INTEREST - U.S. PRAGMATISM
IN THE OPENING OF CHINA, JAPAN AND KOREA
A. EARLY RELATIONS WITH CHINA
America's earliest involvement with East Asia sprang
from strictly economic factors and the young nation's
struggle to find new sources of foreign commerce. Asian
policy began as the policy of the China trade, and it was
based strictly on enhancing the economic interests of
individual Americans rather than establishing an official
framework for diplomatic relations. The manner in which the
American traders conducted their business, however,
Influenced to a great extent the policies that developed in
later years. And so long as free trade prevailed, neither
the merchants nor the government were inclined to press for
greater governmental involvement.
By the time the American traders had inched their way
around the cape of Africa, past insular southeast Asia and
into Canton, the British were already well established
there. The Americans took a thoroughly pragmatic approach
to this situation, however, and were perfectly willing to
operate In the shadow of the British country ships and the
East India Company for a number of reasons. Not the least
of these was the fact that the trade was extensive enough to
support all, and realistically, the American presence was
13
minute compared to that of the British. What is more, the
Americans were nearly powerless to effect any appreciable
influence on British actions due to the lack of any
significant U.S. governmental presence in the area until
mid-century. Only the occasional commercial consul was in
evidence and then with only vaguely defined powers and
respons ib i 1 i t ies
.
China's handling of the western traders as a group also
contributed to an enforced sort of cooperation and harmony
among the Europeans and Americans, Employing the time-
honored Chinese practice of using barbarians against
barbarians, the traders were held accountable as a group for
any infraction of established practices caused by any single
individual or trading company. More wary of the powerful
British presence than of the Americans, the Chinese
specifically played these two against each other.
A dramatic example of this ploy was the Chinese plan to
enlist American support in countering the British during the
latter stages of the First Opium War. Juan YQan, acting
Grand Secretary of the Chinese Court, recommended in 1841,
"If we treat the American barbarians courteously and abolish
their customs duties, and also take the trade of the English
barbarians and give it to the American barbarians, then the
American barbarians are sure to be grateful for this
Heavenly Favor and will energetically oppose the English
barbarians ... If the American barbarians are made use of by
14
us, then other countries will learn of It, and It will not
be difficult to break (the English) down." [ Re f . 6] The
governor general of Kiangsu, Kiangsi, and Anhwe i , I-li-pu,
supported this approach and forwarded it to the Court for
official consideration, adding "...if we utilize the
strength of the American barbarians to curb the English
barbarians, it would seem that the effort would be halved
and the result doubled." [ Re f . 7]
Because they were less well capitalized than the
British, the Americans were much more susceptible to
fluctuations in the trading conditions of Canton. Any
disturbance meant a relatively greater loss since their
reserves were less, and a long term disruption could well
mean financial ruin. In addition, the early Involvement of
the Americans with trading on credit was entirely dependent
on the good will of the Chinese Cohong merchants. Together
these factors were powerful incentives to strive for
harmonious trade relations. Americans could not afford to
be particularly self assertive nor to meet Chinese arrogance
with an arrogance of their own.
Because of their moderate approach in dealing with both
the Chinese and other trading countries, as well as their
desire to maintain a peaceful trading environment, the
Americans came to occupy a middle position in both the trade
and politics of Canton. They eagerly supported the British
when it was necessary to insure the continued smooth flow of
15
trade, but they were also sensitive to the fact that they
needed to maintain the good will of the Chinese merchants
with whom they worked, and to see that they prospered.
According to Tyler Dennet, "Throughout the pre-treaty days
in China, these three groups - English, American and Chinese
- constituted the only important elements in the
situation..." [ Re f . 8] In every issue between the
foreigners and the Chinese, the important question was
whether the Americans would find It most to their advantage
to side with the English or with the Chinese. This
alignment continued long after the signing of the foreign
treaties and underlay American political as well as trade
policy for a century. Sometimes the Americans stood with
the British for concerted action, but when the action
proposed by the British was likely to weaken the Chinese
merchants, or when the British adopted policies having a
negative effect on American trade, the Americans were
disposed to support the Chinese. In the face of British
arrogance and aggression, the Americans found it practical
to ally themselves with the Chinese. C Re f . 9] When the
British extracted the Treaty of Nanking from the Chinese in
1842 and opened an additional five ports to English trade,
the American response was far from moral Indignation over
any kind of British strong arm tactics, but more a straight
forward reaction to a change in the conditions of the market
place. To preserve their place in the trading arena, they
16
immediately took steps to Insure the Chinese granted the
same trading concessions to them as the British had
obtained. Commodore Lawrence Kearney, Commander of the
American East India Squadron, is due the credit for
proposing this historic step and prelude to the Open Door
policy. Significantly, this extension of "most favored
nation" status to not only the United States, but all the
other western trading nations as well, seems to have been
the preferred approach of the Chinese themselves - another
example of using barbarians against each other. The full
impact of this negotiating tactic, however, was not to be in
China's interest in later years as the trading nations came
to use it with abandon to secure for themselves every
prlvillge possible which had been extorted from China by
force, or tricked from her by fraud, but without having to
live up to the moral responsibility for the methods by which
the concession had been obtained in the first place. [ Re f . 101
During this period, and despite their previous
preferences, the American traders in Canton were themselves
responsible for the gradual increase of the presence in
China of American governmental officials. The increasing
American share of the market and the need to keep pace with
the changing conditions governing the China trade had
created a requirement for official consular representation
to safeguard American commercial interests. It was also the
traders who had asked for an American naval presence to
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protect their ships from coastal pirates while the Chinese
authorities were preoccupied with the British during the
First Opium War of 1839.
Although direct economic interests such as these were
clearly in the forefront during this period, American
contempt for imperialism contributed to a commitment to
persuade the other trading nations to show respect for
China's territorial integrity. This was to an extent the
product o f Amer 1 ca ' s own re vo 1 u 1 1 onary or 1 g I ns , bu t was
equally a reflection of the effects of recent political and
commercial encounters with the British, to include the War
of 1812 and Britain's extensive colonization activities from
Africa to Asia. In practical terms, however, had the
European countries embarked on a policy of territorial
acquisition in China to the exclusion of any similar
activity by the United States, the American traders feared
they might soon find themselves without any markets at all
in the Far East. Forgoing territorial concessions thus
became an early factor in the East Asian diplomacy of the
United States.
As evidence, from 1832 to 1857, American Secretaries of
State and other cabinet members made it repeatedly clear to
their diplomatic agents in Asia that "we never make
conquests, or ask any nation to let us establish ourselves
in their countries." [Ref. Ill They stressed that neither
the president nor the Congress would support a more
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aggressive policy in conjunction with France and Great
Britain to force greater concessions from China fRef. 121,
and that the United States does not "seek to enter that
empire for any other purpose than those of legal commerce
not fail to let it be known to the Chinese authorities that
we are not a party to the . . . hostilities and have no
intention to interfere in their political concerns." [ Re f . 13
That the United States did not shy away from the fruits
of such actions taken by others must be attributed to the
influences of its other, more pragmatic interest in securing
equal commercial opportunity. Not to have done so would
have surely edged American traders out of the Asian markets.
More importantly, such policies were a matter of
practicality. The U.S. was not powerful enough to back up
more aggressive policies with the required force. Self
denial thus made virtue out of a necessity.
The signing of the Burlingame Treaty on July 28, 1868
gave official expression to "what might already be called
the traditional American policy with reference to China;
i.e., the sovereignty and integrity of China must be
maintained, and the door for equal opportunities in trade
must be left open for the free competition of all nations
with due regard for the sovereign rights of the (Chinese)
Empire." C Re f . 141 These same principles governed America's
early relations with Japan and Korea as well.
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B. OPENING JAPAN
Commodore Perry's mission in 1854 had been for the
purpose of "opening" Japan to trade with America and the
West, and to acquire maritime agreements that would support
shipping activities in Asia. Unlike the expectations which
had arisen with the development of the China trade, however,
Japan was not considered to have near the significance as
China as a potential market for American commerce. But by
being first to establish formal treaty relations, especially
when the treaty contained the "most favored nation" clause,
insured the American merchants of an equal share in any
trade that might develop there at a later date. Just as
significantly, perhaps, was the fact that America's westward
expansion overland was coming to a halt at the shores of the
California coast. The unexplored lands of Asia, are likely
to have carried much the same allure of the frontier as had
the American West.
For the near term though, the practical aspect of this
venture was in Its goal of establishing Japan as a support
base for the expanding American presence in the Pacific
Ocean. New England whaling and the growth of the American
Northwest as a major supplier of furs for the China market,
brought American clipper ships Increasingly closer to the
shores of Japan as they followed the great circle route
across the Pacific on their way to and from Canton. Safe
haven for disabled vessels and a source of supplies along
20
the route were naturally sought after by the crews of these
vessels. And with the introduction of the steamship into
the Pacific trade, Japan assumed an additional
attractiveness as a potential site for coaling stations.
Japan's location along this route gave it strategic
importance, as well, during this new and growing phase of
American commerce. Commodore Perry, like the later naval
strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, envisioned an increasing
role for America in the Pacific. Naval power would be a
critical element in this role and would need the support of
strategically placed bases throughout the Pacific to carry
it out. To Perry, then, Japan represented much more than
trade and treaties, it was an important first step in the
extension of American political and strategic interests to
Asia and the Pacific. [Ref. 15]
In accordance with the principles developed in support
of the China trade, the treaty with Japan negotiated by
American envoy Townsend Harris in 1858 made no attempt to
secure any exclusive rights. It was intended only to make
sure that American access was achieved and maintained at a
level equal to that which might subsequently be obtained by
the other Western trading nations. Harris had succeeded in
convincing the shoganate authorities that it would be far
better to conclude a full commercial treaty with the
realtively peaceful and friendly United States than to have
to capitulate to even greater demands that might come from
21
the other European powers.
The modernizations and reforms which accompanied the
restoration of the Me i j i in 1868, however, were significant
factors in moving Japan to embark on a policy of militarism
in pursuit of overseas economic interests, and as a means of
strengthening itself against anticipated attempts at
exploitation by the Western powers. In the terms of the
Open Door policy, this transition removed Japan from the
category of countries the policy sought to protect and
recast it among those which it was designed to inhibit. The
kingdoms of Korea and Okinawa were to become early
objectives of such Japanese military action.
C. OPENING KOREA
Korea managed to retain a general policy of foreign
exclusion until Japan, showing that it had learned its
lesson well in its experience with Commodore Perry, forced
the signing of the unequal treaty of Kanghwa. In 1875, the
Japanese made a show of naval power patterned after the
western model used so well against China and, after a brief
military engagement, forced the treaty on 27 February 1876.
Again, as with China and Japan, America's basic
Interests In Korea were fundamentally commercial.
Subsequent to an unsuccessful attempt by the American
minister to China to initiate relations with Korea in 1871,
Commodore R.W. Shufeldt tried first to negotiate a treaty
22
through Japan, but without success. Later, with the
assistance of China's Li Hung-chang, a successful treaty was
negotiated at Tientsin In 1882. Li represented Korea In the
negotiations in the hopes of getting her into treaty
relations with all the trading nations so that the various
commercial activities would create vested interests in
Korea's independence. This was the same tactic China had
used in her own dealings with the western powers, and a
thoroughly pragmatic one at that. Once again she was
employing "barbarians to offset barbarians."
23
Ill . THE OPEN DOOR NOTES AND AMERICA'S RISE TO
WORLD POWER - THE PRAGMATISM OF ROOSEVELT AND HAY
A. ROOTS OF EXPANSION
Despite a preoccupation with the Civil War,
Reconstruction, industrialization and westward expansion
during the last half of the nineteenth century, by 1898 the
United States had developed a well defined East Asian
policy. And even though it had a definite commercial
orientation up until that time, the policy included a number
of subtle political aims that were to take on greater
importance as Asian policy continued to evolve. For the
most part these aims continued to support economic factors,
but other significant factors began to be added as well.
At the top of the list of Asian policy goals was the
notion that American citizens - primarily merchants and
missionaries - should be free to carry out their business in
the countries of Asia without undue outside interference.
The turn of events at the end of the century, however,
suggested that Americans would soon be facing more rather
than fewer restrictions on their activities. China's defeat
in the 1894-95 S ino-Japanese War, for example, had left it
wide open to a mad scramble by the Western Powers and Japan
to carve out spheres of influence and interest. These
actions threatened to completely dismember the Middle
24
Kingdom. From the pragmatic American perspective, such a
subdivision into individual colonies or zones of exclusive
economic and political control meant that American
commercial and missionary interests were likely to be
squeezed out of China altogether. Finding ways to make
China and the other countries of Asia capable of resisting
the pressures of imperialism thus became a key factor in
America's equal access foreign policy.
There were two possible approaches to this goal. The
first was to encourage and even assist the Asian countries
in strengthening themselves politically and/or militarily so
as to be able to deal with the imperialists from a position
of strength. The drawback to this approach, however, was
that those nations which could be strengthened In such a
manner might eventually choose not to engage in trade or
diplomatic relations at all. There was also the possibility
they might become so powerful as to pose a threat to other,
weaker nations in the region, or even to the presence there
of the Western Powers themselves. The Japanese pattern of
development over the last third of the century certainly
seemed to validate the danger of a broad application of such
a pol icy
.
The second approach was to induce the competing powers
to show self-restraint in their efforts to secure exclusive
trade and territorial concessions in Asia. Equal
opportunity and access for all nations would thus be
25
insured. This approach had been generally followed since
Americans first entered the Asian scene, and would later be
found formally expressed as the Open Door policy.
This equal access policy was a model of the pragmatic
approach to Asian policy, especially when compared to the
alternative of being excluded from Asia altogether. But
there were other, more materialistic influences at work in
America which were not entirely compatible with the policy's
"Asia for everybody" theme. It was a time when the momentum
of "Manifest Destiny" and westward expansion seemed to be
coming up short with the ending of the continental frontier
at the Pacific coast. There was considerable pressure to
continue the spread of American territory and influence into
the Pacific Basin and Asia.
In fact, territorial acquisition had already become
somewhat commonplace in the western hemisphere and Pacific.
A brief recap of the fifty year period leading up to the
Spanish-American War serves to illustrate the frequency and
scope of these activities, thereby presenting a better
perspective from which to view the events which followed.
1845 - Annexation of Texas.
1846 - Oregon Territory ceded to U.S. by Great Britain.
1848 - California ceded to U.S. by Mexico.
1853 - Gadsden Purchase.
1853 - Commodore Perry's first visit to Japan; also
establishes coaling stations on the Bonin
Islands and Okinawa.
26
1854 - Perry concludes maritime treaty with Japan.
1854 - U.S. occupies, then withdraws from Galapagos
I slands .
1858 - Treaty concluded with tribal chiefs of the
Polynesian island of Raiatea.
1858 - Harris concludes commercial treaty between U.S.
and Japan.
1867 - U.S. annexes Midway Island and establishes
coaling station there.
1867 - Alaska purchased from Russia.
1871 - First U.S. attempt to secure treaty with Korea.
1875 - Hawaii becomes U.S. quas i -protectorate
.
1878 - U.S. acquires naval base rights to harbor at
Pago Pago, Samoa.
1882 - Commodore Schufeldt obtains mar i t i me /commerc ial
treaty with Korea.
1890 - U.S. takes possession of western Samoa.
1891 - President Harrison sends Marines to Hawaii to
protect Americans from anti-foreign movement led
by Queen Li 1 iuokalan i
.
1893 - L i 1 i uokalan i overthrown and Hawaii offered to
U.S. for annexation.
It can hardly be called surprising that the
expansionism in which the U.S. engaged during this period
could have led so easily to the kind of imperialism which
would accept, though not without some reluctance, the
Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico as spoils of the 1898 war
with Spain. This is especially true when one considers the




There was also a "grand strategy" at work which was
supported by certain key individuals within governmental
circles, and which called for a greater American presence in
Asia and the Pacific, including overseas bases, to support
expanding U.S. security and economic interests in the
region. Perhaps best articulated in the 1880's and 1890's
by the widely respected naval strategist, Captain Alfred
Thayer Mahan, and supported by such Influential friends as
Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, the policy Itself,
as well as many of the specific actions that were advocated,
was not really new. As we have seen, the U.S. had been
actively pursuing the same goals, although in a somewhat
disconnected fashion, for nearly 50 years. Mahan's
contribution was that he was able to combine all the
elements into a cohesive Asian-Pacific strategy, and to
eloquently champion the wisdom and ine v i tabl 1 1 1 ty of this
strategy with great effect. Of equal importance was the
fact that among his most vigorous supporters was a group of
individuals whose placement within government allowed them
to actually put these ideas into practice.
The impact that these men had on the course of
subsequent events leading up to the Spanish-American War
cannot be overstated. Alone Theodore Roosevelt could have
accomplished little, but as a member of a group of men
strategically placed to make themselves felt, he became a
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leader in the movement to win America her place in the
world. [Ref. 16] The membership of this group was small but
impressive. It included Roosevelt, Lodge and Mahan, as well
as Brooks Adams, Henry Adams, Henry White and Richard Olney
two Secretaries of State, one Secretary of the Navy, one
Assistant Secretary of State, and one Assistant Secretary of
the Navy. These men literally engineered the nation's entry
into the ranks of the world's major powers. Collectively
they were known as expansionists, but they had a far greater
vision of America's destiny than that of merely increasing
the size of its physical territory.
The most striking feature about Roosevelt and the other
expansionists was that they were Intense nationalists. They
were determined that America should assume its rightful role
among the leading powers of the world as both a matter of
pride through recognition of its growth and development, as
well as the more practical necessities for asserting greater
control over national security and economic interests.
America had developed into a prosperous and powerful nation
with what they saw as a duty as much as a right to assure
its place among the major powers of the world.
Internally, the U.S. at the end of the century was a
nation made stronger and more confident by the bitter
experience of the Civil War. The rapid economic and
westward territorial expansion that took place in the post-
war years spurred on by the development of the continental
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railways, developed a momentum of increasing prosperity,
strength and expectation of success. In terms of all the
prerequisites for national greatness, at least as regards
domestic and hemispheric issues, America had come of age.
For Roosevelt there was another reason of equal or
greater importance for America to assume a larger role in
international affairs. He saw the expansion of the advanced
nations of Europe as a process by which the benefits of
civilization were being brought to the backwards nations of
the world. Specifically, it was the spread of English-
speaking people that to Roosevelt meant attainment of world
peace and the spread of civilization. It was this belief
which dominated his views in foreign policy. English
civilization - and by this he meant the common heritage
shared by both Great Britain and the United States - referred
to industrial development, the power to defend oneself
effectively, the ability to provide orderly government, an
inherited set of political institutions superior to anyone
else, respect for the freedom of individuals and various
other freedoms that Western Europeans had won over the
centuries. The preservation and extension of this
civilization was in his mind the greatest attainable good,
even if it had to be extended by force. Roosevelt had no
particular concerns for "backward" people when they stood in
the way of civilization. ( Re f . 17]
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In 1894 he wrote that "the object lesson" of expansion
is "that peace must be brought about in the world's waste
spaces... Peace cannot be had until the civilized nations
have expanded in some shape over the barbarous nations."
This "means the cooperation of the civilized peoples of the
earth to that end, whatever the cost or time." [ Re f . 18] To
James Bryce, British statesman and scholar, he wrote in 1897
that "England would be doing her duty as a civilized nation
if she overthrew the Mahdists and opened the Sudan." [ Re f . 19]
English rule in Egypt and India had benefitted these
countries even greater than had been the benefit to England,
but "most of all it... (had) advanced the cause of
civilization." CRef. 201 "It Is in the interest of
civilization," Roosevelt wrote in 1896, "that the English
speaking race should be dominant in South Africa, exactly as
it is... that the United States should be dominant in the
Western Hemisphere." CRef. 211
In an address at the Minnesota State Fair shortly
before he became president in 1901, he told his audience,
"It is our duty toward the people living in barbarism to see
that they are freed from their chains and we can free them
only by destroying barbarism itself... Exactly as it is the
duty of a civilized power scrupulously to respect the rights
of weaker powers... so it is its duty to put down savagery
and barbarism." Acknowledging the possibility that
Injustice might be done In certain instances, he added, "Let
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us instantly condemn and rectify such wrong when it
occurs... But shame... to us if we are so foolish as to
make such occasional wrongdoing an excuse for failing to
perform a great and righteous task... (T)hroughout all
history, the advance of civilization has been of
incalculable benefit to mankind, and those through whom it
has advanced deserve the highest honor." [ Re f . 22)
Statements such as these might lead one to regard
Roosevelt somewhat racist In his views, but It Is Important
to note that there are significant differences In
implication between his stated beliefs and the term as it is
more generally used now. Roosevelt's view was in this
regard again essentially pragmatic. Backwardness in a
culture was a symptom of acquired characteristics and the
effects of geographic environment; he did not view
backwards people as inherently or permanently inferior, nor
did he hold any racial bias toward individuals. The
contempt he openly and repeatedly exhibited toward the
Chinese, despite full knowledge of their long and rich
cultural background, his acquiescence to the Japanese taking
control over Korea, and his willingness to retain the
Philippines, were not due to the origins of these peoples,
but substantially because of their weakness and inability to
govern themselves effectively. [Ref. 231
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C. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES
The external environment in which the expansionists
exercised their influence was just as important as were
their personal views and national aspirations.
Internationally, the newly industrialized nations of Europe
had embarked on a wave of economic imperialism sparked by
the Industrial Revolution that had resulted in a struggle
for power and prestige that was realized through domination
of distant parts of the globe. The acquisition of foreign
markets and sources of raw materials through exclusive
control of foreign territories provided the economic
incentives for the new imperialists, while control or
annexation visibly demonstrated national power, thereby
enhancing a nation's prestige among its contemporaries.
Superficially the new imperialism was a product of
industrial rivalry and conflicting economic nationalism
being played out across the globe. In reality it was a
competition to build national power and prestige in a
struggle for world power.
D. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASIAN POLICY
These then, were the primary determinants of American
foreign policy toward Asia in the watershed period
immediately prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-American
War. Asia had become the central area of world conflict, a
microcosm of all that was taking place in other parts of the
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globe. The Western Powers were anxiously jockeying for
control, forming alliances, and using the Far East as an
area where the intracacies of world politics could be either
unraveled or further entangled.
The war with Spain was a major turning point in
America's conduct of foreign policy and how she viewed
herself with respect to the rest of the world. Beginning as
a crusade to liberate Cuba and an opportunity to force Spain
out of the western hemisphere, the war saw America become a
world power and changed forever.
The acquisition of territory was a by-product and not
an objective of the war. Regarding the possibility of
territorial annexation - in this case, Cuba - Theodore
Roosevelt noted pragmatically in 1898, "I am perfectly
willing to follow the policy of intervening (in Cuba)
without recognizing independence, although I think it a
mistake; for I should be very doubtful about annexing Cuba
In any event, and should emphatically oppose It unless the
Cubans wished it... I don't want it to seem that we are
engaged merely in a land-grabbing war." [Ref. 241
Acquisition of the Philippines was apparently not a
part of any well-thought-out Far Eastern policy. None of
Roosevelt's group of expansionists seemed to have had their
eye on the islands until Mahan found a need for them as he
planned the naval strategy for the hoped-for war with Spain.
In September, 1897 Roosevelt wrote Lodge: "Our Asiatic
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squadron should blockade, and if possible, take Manila."
From then on he worked to put the squadron in shape for that
purpose, to include securing the appointment of Dewey - "a
fighting man who could act with daring" - as its Commander.
[Ref. 251
Once the war had been won and the Philippines taken,
however, there were numerous pragmatic reasons for
rationalizing why the Philippines should remain under
American control. In 1900, Roosevelt stated: "I wish to
see the United States the dominant power on the shores of
the Pacific Ocean... If we did not keep the Philippine
Islands some other power might take them and with them the
capacity to rival us in the Pacific." [Ref. 261 (It is
Interesting to note that similar explanations had been used
earlier to support the acquisition of both Samoa and
Hawaii.) Lodge too, felt one of the most important results
of the Spanish War was our entry into the Pacific and our
gaining a foothold in the Far East. "The Chinese question,
which we are only beginning to understand," he wrote in
1899, "is one of infinitly more importance than the
disposition we make of the Philippines, except insofar as a
position in those islands gives us authority and standing in
the East." [Ref. 27]
And finally, there was Roosevelt's belief that America
had a moral duty toward the Philippines. Expanding American
control over the Islands was the same as extending
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civilization. "Our duty to the Philippines," he said, is to
govern those islands in the interest of the islanders, not
less in accordance with our own honor and interest. He had
a genuine desire to give the Filipinos good government, and
promised liberty, but with order; a sort of tutorial "under
the American flag". "You cannot introduce to people in one
stage of civilization, the system which has been by slow
degrees evolved by another people..." If we have a right to
establish a stable government, it necessarily follows that
not only right but the duty also exists to support that
government until the natives gradually grow fit to sustain
themselves. [ Re f . 281
With that the United States entered the ranks of the
imperialist nations, complete with a colony from which she
was separated by over six thousand miles, and with all the
attendant rights, responsibilities and anxieties that go
along with such a relationship. True, the U.S. was now
firmly entrenched in the Pacific, but there were many
questions yet to be answered over whether or not the
acquisition would prove, in the end, to have been in the
national interest.
E. THE OPEN DOOR NOTES
The S ino-Japanese War of 1894-95 provided the spark that
touched off the scramble for Chinese territorial
concessions. As terms of surrender, Japan demanded China
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turn over Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaotung
Peninsula, give up claim to suzerainity over Korea, grant
new commercial privileges, and pay a large war indemnity.
However, the combined objections of Germany, France and
Russia - the Triple Intervention - were so intense that
Japan was forced to return the Liaotung peninsula in favor
of a larger indemnity.
Nevertheless, the first step had been taken. By 1898,
Germany had obtained extensive rights in China's Shantung
province, to include a naval and coaling station at Kiaochou
Bay; France demanded and got a lease of Kwangchou Bay on
the south China coast and special mining and railroad rights
in the three southern provinces; and Russia extracted a 25
year lease on Port Arthur, Dairen and other parts of the
Liaotung peninsula - much of the same territory Japan had
been forced to return to China just three years before.
Great Britain, too, joined in to obtain a lease on the port
of Weihaiwei for as long as the Russians should hold Port
Arthur, enlargement of her leased territory at Kowloon, and
recognition of her peculiar economic interests in the
Yangtze Valley. The break-up of China feared by the
Americans thus appeared to have begun.
Great Britain's interests would actually have been
better served had she been successful in dissuading the
other powers from these territorial acquisitions. Britain
was experiencing encroachments on her colonial empire around
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the world from many sources, and was finding it difficult to
defend these interests with limited resources. In Asia, in
particular, she was being pressured by France in Indo-China
and Russia in Manchuria and along the Indian frontier. In
an effort to protect her position in the face of these
mounting pressures, she made numerous overtures in search of
an ally with which to form a cooperative Asian policy.
Approaches to establish alliances or "understandings" had
been made to the Un i ted States, Russia, Japan, Germany and
France. Ultimately these bore fruit in the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance of 1902 and the Entente Cordiale with France in
1904, as well as a less formal, but viable working
relationship with the United States throughout the Roosevelt
pres idency
.
The American response to these claims on China's
territory in the late 1890's was out of concern for what
effect these actions would have on its commercial and
missionary interests in China, the same pragmatic concerns
which had been the basis for her Asian policy all along. In
late 1899, Secretary of State John Hay, with British
assistance and support, circulated notes to each of the
powers involved in China asking for assurances that, within
their respective spheres of influence and interest, they
would abide by the principle of equal access and
opportunity. Despite the general ambiguity of the majority
of responses received, Hay summarily announced to the world
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that the provisions contained in these "Open Door notes"
had been accepted by all as the governing policy in China.
Before any of the powers could fully assess the full impact
of this development, the anti-foreign disturbances of the
Boxer Rebellion erupted in China and focused the attention
of all concerned on the settlement of this situation.
This campaign to rid China of foreigners presented the
powers with an easy opportunity to disassociate themselves
from the provisions of the Open Door policy. In an attempt
to preclude such action, however, the United States issued a
follow-on to the first Open Door note which took the policy
a step further. Dated 3 July 1900, the second circular
declared that the "policy of the Government of the United
States is to seek a solution" of the difficulties in China
which would "preserve Chinese territorial and administrative
entity" and "safeguard for the world the principle of equal
and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."
It was the reference to the "territorial and administrative
entity" of China which made the second Open Door notes
significant as the passage ran directly counter to those
activities in which the powers had been engaging in China up
to that time.
There was little in the way of concrete response to the
second round of the Open Door notes as well, as the powers
generally ignored this latest initiative of the United
States. Despite this fact, however, no claims against
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Chinese territory were made by the powers as settlement for
putting down the Boxers. Somewhat ironically, however, it
was not the Open Door notes that were responsible for the
suspension of territorial claims. Other outside events that
were taking place in scattered parts of the globe, such as
the Boer War and maneuverings by the powers to form
coalitions against one another, had simply caused a
"political stalemate rather than conversion to principle.
No power dared move further for fear of precipitating the
universal debacle that was destined to come a decade later."
[Ref. 291
Neither was China entirely spared from the continued
erosion of her sovereignty. The indemnity claims of the
powers for their expedition against the Boxers were fixed at
a total of $333 million, an amount China hardly could afford
to pay. The only way she would be able to liquidate such
substantial debts was by resorting to additional territorial
concessions. Recognition of this development was a major
disappointment to Hay and those who had assisted in the
writing of the Open Door notes from the beginning.
Essentially a diplomatic tactic, the notes had been in
no way legally binding on any of the powers or on the U.S.
It was the way In which they were presented that gave them
any effect. That is, they were deliberately contrived so as
to create the impression of an international commitment and
to mobilize public opinion for its support. In February,
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1901 Hay was asked by Japan what action the U.S. was
prepared to take should Russia, in violation of the Open
Door principles, seek to strengthen her economic and
political hold on Manchuria? Unable to force the ideals of
the Open Door, his response was thoroughly pragmatic. He
replied that the United States was not prepared to back up
its policy with force, either alone or in concert with other
powers. While he was anxious to support a policy that
promoted the commonality of interests held between the
United States and Great Britain, as well as insuring the
American position was upheld in Asia, Hay had to recognize
that neither would the Senate accept an alliance or treaty
with England and/or Japan, nor would public opinion support
a war in defense of the nation's Far Eastern policies.
[Ref. 301 The Japanese question to Secretary Hay proved to
be a significant indicator of what was to come, as both she
and Russia were clearly on a collision course over control
of Manchuria.
F. JAPAN'S INCREASING ROLE
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 had been the answer
to England's search for an ally in Asia. Since Russia was
the chief rival of Britain in Southwest Asia and of Japan in
the Far East, it was natural that the two should join
together in an alliance to check Russian expansion. The
terms of the alliance recognized each others' interests in
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China, as well as Japan's special interest in Korea, and, in
order to protect those interests, each pledged to remain
neutral if the other became involved in a war with a third
party and to come to the support of the other should it be
attacked by two or more enemies.
Continued Russian encroachments into Manchuria and
northern Korea, followed by a failure of negotiations begun
in 1903, led to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in
February, 1904.
The American position with regard to the war was one of
conditional support for the Japanese. President Roosevelt
was convinced of the commonality, but not necessarily the
identity, of British and American interests in Asia ( Re f
.
31], and so looked on the alliance as maintaining the
balance of power in Asia and resisting further territorial
demands on China. Russian expansionism, on the other hand,
clearly represented the chief threat to the status quo.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, Japanese successes
during the war were greater than had been anticipated.
Roosevelt, now faced with a potential Japanese victory and
the possibility that one threat (Russia) might merely be
replaced by another (Japan), had to reevaluate the extent of
American support. Once more thoroughly pragmatic, he came
to favor a position that supported dragging out the
hostilities as long as possible so as to exhaust both
powers, and retaining geographic causes of friction. [ Re f . 32]
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Such a solution was hoped to keep both countries
preoccupied with the threat from each other, decreasing
their appetites for further territorial expansion and
relieving pressures against Europe from Russia, and against
America's newly acquired territories in the Philippines from
Japan
.
To secure the resolution of the conflict along lines
which would support these objectives, the president sent his
envoy, Secretary of War Taft, to Tokyo where a memorandum
was completed with Japanese Prime Minister Katsura on
29 July 1905. In that document, the United States took the
practical position of agreeing to Japan's suzerainity over
Korea in return for her disavowal of any hostile intent
toward the Philippines. Japan's position in Korea was
further certified by Russia's acceptance of these terms in
settlement of the war at Portsmouth later in 1905, the
conference being mediated by Roosevelt on the condition that
Japan agree to adhere to the maintenance of the Open Door
policy in Manchuria and return administrative control of
that region to China.
The year 1905 saw Roosevelt's greatest admiration for
the Japanese, even despite any second thoughts he might have
had regarding the destabilizing influences that might arise
in Asia as a result of her victory over Russia. It was
during this time also, that negotiations were going on
between Japan and England for renewal of the Anglo-Japanese
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Alliance, during which Roosevelt was kept very well informed
and participated informally in discussions that eventually
resulted in its renewal. Significantly, on 1 January 1905,
Roosevelt told John Hay that he favored a suggested naval
defense alliance with Japan, and again in May stated that he
personally agreed that an alliance with Japan was desirable.
Realistically, of course, he admitted such an arrangement
was not practicable in light of the Senate's attitude toward
treaties in general. CRef. 33]
During Taft's Discussions with Katsura in July, the
Japanese Prime Minister wondered why, "In view of our common
interests... some good understanding, or an alliance in
practice if not in name, should not be made?" Taft
explained that it was difficult for the president to enter
even into an informal agreement without the consent of the
Senate, but he assured the Japanese that "wherever occasion
arose, appropriate action of the government of the United
States, in conjunction with Japan and Great Britain for such
purposes, could be counted on by them quite as confidently
as if the United States were under treaty obligations."
Afterwards, Taft cabled the whole agreement to Roosevelt who
replied "your conversation with Count Katsura absolutely
correct in every respect. Wish you would confirm to Katsura
that I confirm every word you have said." [Ref. 341
Despite these informal assurances and confirmation of
parallel interests, Japan's rapid rise to major power status
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evoked serious concerns among many quarters in the United
States. Her growing presence in Korea and Manchuria
obviously ran counter to the Open Door principles, and
despite her assurances, the safety of the Philippines was
becoming uncertain. Additionally, U.S. immigration
restrictions imposed as a result of domestic pressures added
to these concerns by further straining relations between the
two nat i ons
.
Sensing a growing hostility in Tokyo's representations
to Washington, President Roosevelt became convinced of the
necessity of making a clear demonstration of American
resolve. To fulfill this objective, he dispatched an
American naval fleet of 16 battleships on an around the
world cruise in 1907. The significance of Its first stop
being Japan was not lost on anyone. Perhaps not
surprisingly, however, the visit by the "Great White Fleet",
though temporarily putting a halt to some careless talk of
war in Japan, provided the stimulus for the Japanese navy to
embark on a naval expansion program of its own.
Subsequently, in a more conciliatory gesture, Roosevelt
went on to pursue the lines laid down by Taft and Katsura
three years earlier. In an exchange of notes between
Secretary of State Root and Japanese Ambassador Takahira on
30 November 1908, the U.S. and Japan "agreed (1) to maintain
the status quo in the Pacific and to respect each other's
territorial possessions in that region; (2) to uphold the
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Open Door in China; and (3) to support by pacific means the
* independence and integrity of China.'"
Two points regarding this agreement are significant.
First, both this and the Taft-Katsura memorandum were
executive agreements, binding only on the Roosevelt
administration. Neither was ratified by the Senate.
Second, that which was left unsaid was perhaps of greater
importance than that which was stipulated. That is, the
agreement was vague enough to be interpre tated in at least
two ways. The first, favorable to the American position,
was that Japan had promised to support the Open Door policy
and territorial integrity of China, although "territorial"
integrity was not specified; plus she had renounced
aggressive intentions against the Philippines. The second
interpretation, favorable to Japan, was that in return for
Japan's pledge to respect the security of the Philippines,
the U.S. had given Japan a free hand in Manchuria. The wide
latitude between the two views allowed each side to justify
the negotiations as having been concluded on terms favorable
to its respective position.
Notably, when President Taft assumed office he
reasserted the twin principles of the Open Door policy, much
to Japan's chagrin. This reversal of Roosevelt's earlier
position gives evidence to the fact that Roosevelt's
adherence to Taft's own understanding with Katsura and the
later Root-Takahira Agreement had been intentionally
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qualified and little more that a temporary expedient to
smooth American-Japanese relations at a time of growing
friction. [ Re f . 35]
On 22 December 1910, Roosevelt wrote to Taft, at the
latter's request, concerning America's Asian policy and
relations with Japan:
Our vital interest is to keep the Japanese out of
our country* and at the same time to preserve the good
will of Japan. The vital interest of the Japanese, on
the other hand, is in Manchuria and Korea. It is
therefore peculiarly our interest not to take any steps
as regards Manchuria which will give the Japanese cause
to feel, with or without reason, that we are hostile to
them, or a menace - in however slight a degree - to
their interests. Alliance with China, in view of
China's absolute military helplessness, means of course
not an additional strength to us, but an additional
obligation we assume; and as I utterly disbelieve in
the policy of bluff, in national or international no
less than private affairs, or in any violation of the
old frontier maxim, "Never draw unless you mean to
shoot!" I do not believe in our taking any position
anywhere unless we can make good; and as regards
Manchuria, if the Japanese choose to follow a course
conduct to which we are adverse, we cannot stop it
unless we are prepared to go to war, and a successful
war about Manchuria would require a fleet as good as
that of England plus an army as good as that of
Germany. The Open Door policy in China was an
excellent thing, and I hope it will be a good thing in
the future, so far as it can be maintained by general
diplomatic agreement; but, as has been proved by the
whole history of Manchuria, alike under Russia and
under Japan, the "Open Door" pol icy, as a matter of
fact, completely disappears as soon as a powerful
nation determines to disregard it, and is willing to
run the risk of war rather than forgo its intention.
[Ref. 36]
of
* That is, to restrict Japanese emigration to the U.S
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Roosevelt's analysis of the situation surrounding the
Open Door policy and the realities of the balance of power
in Northeast Asia graphically illustrates the pragmatic
outlook that characterized his overall approach to foreign
policy. But even "the great pragmatist" was not entirely
without his own brand of idealism. His vision of America's
destiny and feelings of moral responsibility for "civilizing
the backward regions of the world" were certainly as
idealistic as the majority of his successors.
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IV. WWI : PRELUDE AND SETTLEMENT - THE
PRAGMATISM OF WOODRQW WILSON
A. PREWAR YEARS
In the four-year interval between Roosevelt and Wilson,
President William H. Taft and his Secretary of State,
Philander C. Knox, were giving the Open Door policy a new
turn. In 1909, they proposed to the Powers that the railway
concessions in Manchuria which had been granted to Japan and
Russia be returned to Chinese ownership and that their
administration be "neutralized" and placed under the
stewardship of a board of supervisors representing all the
Powers. Popularly referred to as "Dollar Diplomacy", this
new turn in policy was conceived to serve political and
economic objectives simultaneously. The new policy
encouraged American investment in Manchuria as a means of
breaking the development monopoly of Japan and Russia while
assisting American business to cash in on the still elusive
China trade. A lengthy State Department memorandum dated
30 September 1909 asserted that pragmatic and materially
beneficial tactics could serve more idealistic goals:
The nations that finance the great Chinese railways and
other enterprises will be foremost in the affairs of
China and the participation of American capital in
these investments will give the voice of the U.S. more
authority in political controversies in that country
which will go far toward guaranteeing the preservation
of the administrative entity of China...
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However , ...
So long as the U.S. holds the Philippines, the
domination of China by other nations to our exclusion
would be fraught with danger and it is unthinkable that
this country should be squeezed out of any combination
exercising an influence at Peking. The balancing of
power in China is essential to peace in the Orient just
as it has been necessary in Turkey to keep Europe
quiet. Our interests in Asiatic waters require the
prevention of the establishment of predominant interest
and influence at Peking on the part of the other powers
and that American prestige in China be undiminished.
[Ref. 37]
America's growing security interests in Asia and the Pacific
were thus demanding an increasingly direct approach in her
policy toward the region.
In Its final assessment, however, Dollar Diplomacy fell
far short of its objectives. Proving to be financially
unprofitable, it saw American investments in the Far East
drop from $175 million in 1909 to $60 million in 1912.
[Ref. 381 In terms of the Open Door policy, it fostered
international competition rather than cooperation, and had
certainly not managed to save Manchuria for either China or
American capitalists. More importantly, Instead of dividing
Japan and Russia, it had driven the two more closely
together in defense of their respective interests in
Manchuria and Mongolia. [Ref. 39]
B. WW I IN ASIA
At the outbreak of World War I, China requested American
assistance in preventing the spread of hostilities on
Chinese soil where many of the belligerents had foreign
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settlements and leased territories. Accepting this request,
the United States again announced its "desire to preserve
the status quo in China." Then, when Japan subsequently
entered the war against Germany and demanded the surrender
of Germany's leased territory in Shantung, Secretary of
State William Jennings Bryan parried with the response that
the United States "notes with satisfaction" that the demand
had been made "with the purpose of restoring that territory
to China, and that Japan is seeking no territorial
aggrandizement in China." Bryan also used the opportunity
to remind Japan of its pledges to support "the independence
and integrity of China and the principle of equal
opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in
China" as contained In the Root-Takahlra Agreement of
30 November 1908. C Re f . 40]
Early in 1915, after having secured Shantung from
German control, Japan secretly presented China with an
ultimatum known as the Twenty One Demands. Peking's
acceptance of these would have resulted in the establishment
of near total Japanese economic and political supremacy in
China. When the nature of the demands were leaked by the
Chinese government, a wave of protest swept over China while
Great Britain and the United States lodged official
protests. Ultimately, the most extreme of these demands
were withdrawn, though an agreement on the remainder was
pushed through which gave Japan significant economic
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concessions in Manchuria and Mongolia, while confirming her
newly attained position in Shantung. At this, Secretary
Bryan notified both Tokyo and Peking on 11 May 1915, that
the United States "cannot recognize any agreement or
undertaking which has been entered into or which may be
entered into between the Governments of Japan and China,
impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its
citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of
the Republic of China, or the international policy relative
to China commonly known as the Open Door policy." [Ref. 41]
In view of the pressing events that were occurring in
Europe at the time, neither the United States nor the Allies
were in any position to oppose Japan's actions toward China
more vigorously than this. Bryan's note, therefore, had not
been counted on to disuade Japan from coercing China, but to
put on record a reservation "so that any agreement forced
upon China at the present time could properly become the
subject of discussion in the future when the conditions are
more propitious." [Ref. 421 Its effect was to convince the
Japanese of the need for a more definite understanding with
the United States and, in this regard, led directly to the
Lans ing-Ishi i negotiations of 1917. It was later, when the
note was discovered by Secretary Stimson, that it gained
fame as the non-recognition doctrine of 1932.
Insofar as the Lans ing-Ish i i Agreement was intended to
moderate the opposing purposes of Japan and the United
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States in their respective Asian policies, it was a complete
failure. For while Japan agreed to adhere, once again, to
the principle of the Open Door and oppose "the acquisition
by any government of any special rights or privileges that
would affect the independence or territorial integrity of
China," the United States agreed to "recognize that
territorial propinquity creates special relations between
countries, and consequently, the Government of the United
States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China,
particularly in the part to which her possessions are
contiguous." [ Re f . 431 With the subsequent Japanese
interpretation of the term "special interests" to imply
political influence, it was clear that the agreement's
ambiguity and the dichotomy of Its content allowed It to be
construed by each side as suited its own purposes. For the
United States it had been a temporary stopgap, not a
compromise, necessitated purely because of the reality of
the events in Europe which sapped, for the time being, any
ability to deal more strongly with the situation in Asia.
C. OPPOSING THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE
A. Whitney Griswold noted in 1938 that "in 1917, America
was preparing for the greatest diplomatic offensive against
Japanese expansion in its history. But it was not until the
armistice lessened President Wilson's preoccupation with
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Germany that he was free to devote much energy to that
of fens i ve . " [Ref . 44]
1 . Moderation Through Cooperation
This diplomatic assault was executed in four parts.
The first was centered around a plan for the formation of a
consortium of English, French, Japanese, and American banks
to jointly finance China's development needs. The prime
objective of this approach was to try, once again, to secure
the administrative integrity and independence of China by
preempting unilateral actions aimed at gaining territorial
influence or acquisition. This arrangement was not unlike
the "neutralization" plan of Secretary Knox in 1909, and it
met with equally strong Japanese opposition. Only when the
United States agreed to exclude the South Manchurian Railway
zone and a number of other specific railway, mining and
industrial priviliges from the scope of the consortium plan
did Japan finally consent to join. The result was
considerably short of an ideal solution to the problem, but
did represent some degree of success.
2 . Intervention in Siberia
The second part of the American "offensive" was
carried out as part of the 1918 military Intervention in
Siberia to protect allied military supplies and sustain the
White Russian forces in the war against Germany. The
American objective there was to resist Japanese penetration
of northern Manchuria and Siberia in what amounted to the
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application of the Open Door principles to Russia.
Conversely, the Japanese objective was to prevent, by
whatever means possible, either the establishment of a Far
East Soviet Republic or a White Russian victory, thereby
reducing potential opposition to future Japanese involvement
in the region. [ Re f
.
45] Notably, American forces stayed on
in Siberia well after the armistice and until the complete
collapse of any effective White Russian resistance, the last
American troops leaving Vladivostok on 1 April 1920. The
Japanese, on the other hand, did not evacuate Siberia until
November 1922 and northern Sakhalin in 1925.
For her efforts, Japan had overrun northern Manchuria
and extended her privileges and influence there. But
despite the numerous battles she had fought against the
Bolsheviks, she had taken over no Russian territory.
3
. The Paris Peace Conference
The third phase took place attack at the Paris Peace
Conference in 1919, where Woodrow Wilson fought a losing
battle to defend China from Japanese encroachment in the
peace treaty negotiation process. Japan came to the
conference determined not to repeat her experience following
the war with China in 1895 and the forced remission of the
Liaotung peninsula. She not only maintained de facto
control over Shantung, but was supported by the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance of 1902 and 1911, secret treaties with
Great Britain and the other allies which had been concluded
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in 1917 and which agreed to postwar Japanese control over
the territory, similar treaties with Russia and China with
the same effect, and the ambiguous American "concession"
contained in the Lans ing-Ishi i Agreement.
Wilson vigorously opposed, but did not succeed in
preventing either Germany's privileges in Shantung or her
Pacific island possessions north of the equator from being
ceded to Japan. Faced with an unyielding Japanese position
on these points, he had only two choices: outright
rejection of Japan's claims with a certainty that her
representatives would walk out of the conference if he did
so, or accepting them in the hopes of addressing the issue
later within the framework of the League of Nations. That
he ultimately accepted the latter alternative clearly
demonstrates that Woodrow Wilson too, was pragmatic In his
approach to foreign affairs, and willing to suspend or adapt
his Idealistic goals to the situation at hand.
The only hope was to keep the world together, get the
League of Nations with Japan In It and then try to
secure justice for the Chinese not only as regarding
Japan but England, France, Russia, all of whom had
concessions in China... He knew his decision would be
unpopular in America, that the Chinese would be
bitterly disappointed, that the Japanese would feel
triumphant, that he would be accused of violating his
„own principles, but, nevertheless, he must work for
world order and organization against anarchy and a
return to the old militarism. [ Re f . 461
4. The Washington Naval Conference
Finally, it was left to the Harding administration
to pursue the fourth phase in the diplomatic campaign
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against Japanese expansionism. There was a large body of
American opinion in the post-war years that arms competition
had been a primary cause of World War I and that some kind
of world disarmament agreement would contribute
significantly to preventing furure conflicts. This feeling
coincided with Great Britain's unwillingness and inability
to compete with the United States in a naval race, as well
as a desire to work out some kind of accomodation as
regarded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The result of this
convergence of objectives was President Harding's call, on
11 July 1921, for a conference in Washington of the five
Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the limitation of
armaments and question relating to the Far East and Pacific
Ocean.
Thus, beginning on 12 November 1921 and continuing
until 6 February 1922, two concurrent conferences took place
to discuss the issues which had been placed before them:
the five-power conference on disarmament, attended by the
United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan; and
the nine-power conference on the problems of the Far East
made up of the original five plus Portugal, China, the
Netherlands and Belgium.
A significant series of treaties emerged from this
diplomatic marathon, including the Nine Power Treaty on the
Far East and Pacific which epitomized American Far Eastern
policy since John Hay, and forged it into international law.
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First, the Four Power Pacific Treaty (13 December 1921)
among Great Britain, Japan, France and the United States
replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and substituted for it
an agreement to respect each other's "rights in relation to
their insular possessions and insular dominions in the
region of the Pacific Ocean," and for mutual consultations
in the event of threat to these territories.
The Sino-Japanese Treaty (4 February 1922), undertaken
with considerable British and American assistance just to
keep the two countries negotiating, restored Shantung in
full sovereignty to China, but according to the terms of the
Japanese railway loan, did not alter significantly Japan's
economic and consequent political supremacy in the
territory. In addition, a pledge was extracted from Japan
to withdraw her troops from Siberia and northern Sakhalin
which were the remnants of the allies' Siberian intervention
forces
.
The Five Power Naval Treaty (5 February 1922)
consum&ted the disarmament aims of the conference by
providing for a reduction and limitation of naval forces in
the ratio of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 among its signatories, the
United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy,
respectively. In addition, the treaty included a
non-fortification agreement which prohibited the
construction of new fortifications and naval bases west of
Hawaii and east of Singapore.
58
In the Nine Power Treaty (6 February 1922) the
signatories agreed to "respect the sovereignty, the
independence, and the territorial and administrative
integrity of China; to provide the fullest and most
unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain
for herself an effective and stable government; to use
their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing
and maintaining the principle of equal oportunity for the
commerce and industry of all nations throughout the
territory of China; and to refrain from taking advantage of
conditions in China in order to seek special rights or
privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or
citizens of friendly states, and from countenacing action
inimical to the security of such States."
Concurrently, a nine-power customs tariff treaty was
signed the same date which provided for a rise in Chinese
duties. While it was less than the Chinese had wanted and
far short of tariff autonomy, it provided for a substantial
increase in revenue. [ Re f . 471
Finally, a treaty was signed on 11 February 1922
concerning the status of American interests on the island of
Yap. The issue, left unsettled fom the Paris Peace
conference, arose out of the existence on Yap, a former
German possession mandated to Japan at Paris, of important
American radio and trans-Pacific cable facilities. In the
treaty, the United States consented to Japan's mandate over
59
the island, as well as the other islands north of the
equator which she had occupied from Germany, in return for
which Japan granted American citizens equal cable, radio and
residential rights and facilities on the island with
Japanese
.
D. THE KELLOGG PACT AND STIMSON'S NON-RECOGNITION DOCTRINE
Still searching for peace and world order through
international organization, on 27 August 1928 the United
States entered Into the Kellogg Pact to which over 50
nations ultimately declared their adherence by January 1929.
The pact was a renunciation of war as an instrument of
national policy and a promise to use only peaceful means in
the settlement of disputes between the signatories. Less
than a year after the pact was signed, however, Soviet and
Chinese conflict over Manchuria presented occasion for
Secretary of State Stimson to invoke the Pact's principles
in an attempt to end the hostilities. The loosely
structured nature of the Pact and the absence of any
organization for its implementation, however, precluded its
effectiveness and the controversy was subsequently settled
in direct negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and China which
restored the status quo.
Japan's takeover of all Manuchuria in 1931-32, its
attacks on Shanghai and the ultimate establishment of the
state of Manchukuo prompted the U.S. to attempt to end the
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hostilities in collaboration with the League of Nations and
to restore the situation to the condition which had existed
prior to the conflict. The League's failure to take action
of sufficient force to attain these objectives, however, led
the United States to act independently in the revival of the
non-recognition doctrine of Bryan and Lansing which had been
used in conjunction with Japan's Twenty-One Demands on China
in 1915. On 7 June 1932, Stimson informed Japan and China
that the United States could not...
(A)dmit the legality of any situation de facto nor does
it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered
into between those governments, or agents thereof,
which may impair the treaty rights of the United States
or its citizens in China, including those which relate
to the sovereignty , the independence, or the
territorial and administrative integrity of the
Republic of China, or to the international policy
relative to China, commonly known as the open-door
policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any
situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought
about by means contrary to the covenants and
obligations of the Pact of Paris (Kellogg Pact) of
27 August 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan,
as well as the United States are parties. [Ref. 48]
Neither collective nor unilateral action short of armed
force were able to dissuade Japan from expanding her control
over Chinese territory. Diplomatic principle had again
fallen victim to the material realities of the situation.
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V. INTERESTS IN CONFLICT - THE PRAGMATISM OF FDR
A. DOMESTIC CONCERNS
Despite his internationalist views, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt was constrained in his involvement in the
conduct of foreign policy by the mandate he had received to
bring the country back, economically and socially, from the
depths of the Great Depression. This strong orientation of
priorities toward domestic issues gave a distinct character
to both the substance and the manner in which U.S. Asian
policy was implemented during FDR's first term of office.
The overall tone of the policy, however, was little changed
from that which had been engineered by Hoover and Stimson.
FDR was generally sympathetic to the plight of China because
of the long ties his family had there, and as a longtime
advocate of international cooperation against war and the
appointed leader of a nation whose people were asking for
disarmament and peace, he felt compelled to condemn the
Japanese actions in Manchuria in 1931. ( Re f . 491 Therefore,
two months before taking office, and after long
consultations with Stimson, Roosevelt announced that his
administration would continue the doctrine of




FDR's overriding commitment to domestic issues during
the first term left his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull,
with nearly complete control of the management of American
foreign policy, particularly Asian policy as it was a
subject in which Hull had a special interest. He too, felt
the U.S. had a "definite interest... in maintaining the
independence of China and in preventing Japan from gaining
over-lordship of the entire Far East." [Ref. 50]
The Asia policy the administration adopted, however,
was not one which needed much in the way of detailed
management. At its center was the approach the
administration took in its relations with Japan. It was a
policy of non-provocation and dedicated efforts to seek a
relaxation of tensions, and its primary feature was the
cessation of the contentious communication that had been
exchanged between the two countries throughout Stimson's
tenure. Specifically, the policy's main objective was to
avoid all initiatives in the Far East. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Chief of the State Department's Far Eastern Division, stated
in May 1934, that "The United States has not much to lose"
from further Japanese aggression in China, and "...from the
point of view of material interests there is nothing there
that is vital to us." [Ref. 51] Such a policy of non-action
fit well with the Good Neighbor policy toward Latin America
and the Neutrality Acts of 1935-37. It was a matter of
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practicality for FDR to put foreign affairs on hold while he
concentrated his efforts on solving problems at home.
Simultaneous with this program to maintain a low
diplomatic profile in Asia, however, FDR backed a major
buildup of the Navy to the treaty limits of the Five Power
Treaty of 1922, and ordered the battleship fleet to remain
in the Pacific where it had been on maneuver since 1932. As
a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy and firm believer
in Mahan's theories of the Importance of sea power,
Roosevelt felt that a ship building program was essential to
get the U.S. Navy "almost up to the ship strength of the
Japanese navy," to which "our navy was, and probably is
actually inferior... The further fact that the whole scheme
of things in Tokio does not make for an assurance of
non-aggression in the future," he added, made the building
program necessary.
There was a domestic economic basis for the naval
buildup as well, as it was expected that it could have a
significant contribution to national economic recovery.
Consequently, the program was further justified on the
grounds of being likely to employ workers and use materials
from nearly all the states in the Union, and to make labor
the recipient of 80 percent of all the shipbuilding
expenditures. [ Re f . 521
With the occurrence of the China "incident" between
Japanese and Chinese troops at Marco Polo bridge just
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outside of Peiping in July 1937, the confrontation between
the two nations took on even more of the character of an all
out war. American reaction to these events clearly
demonstrated the unwillingness of the FDR administration to
get involved. At first the U.S. took an impartial attitude
toward the two belligerents, but later joined with the
League of Nations in condemning Japan's hostile actions and
violation of the Nine-Power Treaty. In a 5 Ocotber 1937
speech in Chicago, the president suggested a "quarantine" of
those nations of the world which were engaged in an
"epidemic of world lawlessness." There was little question
but that this was in referrence to Japan's war against
China, but without mentioning her by name. Public reaction
was so negative to the idea, however, that Roosevelt did not
pursue it any further.
The second incident, in December of that year, was the
Japanese bombing of the American gunboat Panay while it was
escorting American tankers in the Yangtze River. The
incident was apparently an act of overzealousness on the
part of the pilots involved, but it was impossible to
explain away as a mistake. The Japanese government,
however, was quick to extend its apologies and offer
reparations to the casualties. As a result, American public
opinion took the matter rather casually, contrasting sharply
with the outcry that had followed the similar incident
involving the battleship Maine in 1898.
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Widespread opposition to the growing use of aircraft in
a bombing role, particularly the Japanese bombing attack on
Nanking In September 1937, lead to the application of the
so-called "moral -embargo " in mid-1938. Curtailing the
shipment of aircraft, aircraft parts and accessories, and
aerial bombs to nations guilty of bombing civilian
populations, it was the first official achievement of the
supporters of economic sanctions against Japan.
B. HARDENING POSITIONS
Japan's declaration of a "New Order for East Asia",
followed closely by its siezure of Hainan Island in February
1939 and the Spratley Islands a month later, hardened the
Roosevelt administration's attitude toward the developing
situation in the Pacific, and led to the announcement, on 26
July 1939, that the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
between the two countries would be terminated following the
required six month notification period. Once that occurred,
on 26 February 1940, the United States was in a position to
employ significant economic measures against Japan, and went
forward to increasingly restrict the shipment of oil, scrap
iron, machinery, machine tools and other war material.
Finally, on 26 July 1941, Roosevelt froze all Japanese
assets in the U.S., thereby cutting off virtually all trade
with Japan. The significance of these acts was much more
widespread than just shutting off a major source of materiel
66
for Japan's war effort - this trade was vital for her
civilian industries as well. From Japan's point of view,
her national survival was at stake.
The reasons for the President's increasingly stringent
actions were many, but unlike earlier instances of friction,
trade opportunities were not a significant aspect. There
was strong public sentiment and, therefore, idealistic
interest over the plight of China that had roots in the
American missionary efforts that had been going on there for
a century. China was seen as a victim rather than a
practicioner of power politics, and she was untainted by
imperialism, Communism or fascism. She consistently
received high marks as an ally in American public opinion
polls during the war, and was popularly regarded as
America's natural democratic ally. CRef. 531 But there
were more substantive reasons as well.
Japan's increasing territorial conquests along the
Chinese coastal regions and into French Indochina were made
in flagrant disregard for innumerable international
agreements as well as the broader principles of the Open
Door policy. What is more, as Japan was the eastern agent
of the Axis Powers, the security of other Allied territories
in the Far East, to include the Philippines, were becoming
increasingly vulnerable. But the most compelling reason was
the scope of the threat which could potentially develop
should Japan gain control over all of Asia. Not only would
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vital American interests in Asia and the Pacific become
endangered, but continental America, as well, could be
placed in jeopardy. In the larger terms of global strategy,
it was unthinkable that the Axis Powers might gain control
of the entire Eastern Hemisphere.
The road to eventual war with Japan was not without
substantial efforts at negotiation. The disparity between
the terms that each side was willing to accept, howver, was
too great to overcome since vital national interests were at
stake which were mutually incompatible. Japan had offered a
"bottom line" proposal as follows: (1) Neither government
would send armed forces into the Southeast Asia or South
Pacific area, except Indochina; (2) the two governments
would cooperate to secure needed commodities from the
Netherlands Indies; (3) commercial relations would be
restored to their status before the freezing of funds, and
the United States would supply Japan "the required quantity
of oil"; (4) the United States would not "resort to
measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavors for the
restoration of general peace between Japan and China";
(5) Japan would move its troops in southern Indochina into
the northern portion upon the conclusion of this agreement,
and withdraw all troops from Indochina upon making peace
with China "or the establishment of an equitable peace in
the Pac i f ic area .
"
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The Roosevelt administration's response, however, was
that these conditions were totally unacceptable. Secretary
Hull later commented that they "would have placed (Japan) in
a commanding position later to acquire control of the entire
western Pacific area... It would have meant abject
surrender of our position under intimidation..." In
addition, the proposal had made no mention of the provisions
of the Tripartite Pact (between Japan, Germany and Italy)
which would have required Japan to assist either of the
other Axis powers if a state of war should develop between
either of them and the U.S.; moreover, the reverse was also
true. The American counter-proposal was a ten point
proposal centering on the withdrawal of all Japanese troops
from China and Indochina, and a virtual disavowal of the
Tripartite Pact. It was at this point, with no greater
agreement than this great chasm, that the negotiations stood
when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.
Although the United States had been supporting China
for some time in her war with the Japanese, the attack on
Pearl Harbor made the two countries true allies. American
policy with regard to China, as defined by Hull, came to be
directed toward two goals: to insure China could remain
effective in her fight against Japan, and to raise China to
great power status so that she might serve as a stabilizing
influence in postwar Asia. [Ref. 541
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C. EUROPE FIRST
Even before America officially entered the war, FDR's
planners participated heavily in the development of Allied
strategy that subordinated the conflict in Asia to that in
Europe. It is sometimes suggested that such a decision
resulted from a racial bias which favored Europe over Asia.
In fact, it was a purely pragmatic decision which sought the
defeat of the Axis in Europe before German scientists could
develop a superweapon that might prolong the war or turn its
tide against the Allies. For Asia, the strategy was to
fight a holding action, while providing sufficient materiel
support and encouragement to China to maintain her ability
as an effective deterrent to Japanese overland advances.
The mission of the remaining Allied forces in Asia was to
repel Japanese advances where possible and delay elsewhere,
relying on what limited resources could be made available to
them
.
D. SEEKING SOVIET SUPPORT
As the war waged on, both the American and British
governments concluded that Russian assistance would be
ind i spens ible against Japan if the war in the Far East was
to be brought to an early conclusion. Stalin had promised
such aid within a period of "two or three months" after the
German surrender, but noted there were certain political
questions" that should be answered before Russia entered the
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war. These questions became the terms of the Yalta
Conference and the price the Allies had to pay for Russian
assistance. They were:
1. Preservation of the status quo in Outer Mongolia;
i.e., continuance of the Soviet-sponsored Mongolian
People's Republic in an area long claimed by China.
2. Restoration of the "former rights of Russia
violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904";
namely (a) return to the Soviet Union of southern
Sakhalin; (b) internationalizing of the port of Dairen,
with safeguards for the "pre-eminent interests of the
Soviet Union," and restoration to Russia of the lease
of Port Arthur for a naval base; (c) the Chinese
Eastern and South Manchurian Railroads to be operated
by a joint Soviet-Chinese company, with safeguards for
the "pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union" and
retention of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria.
3. Cession of the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union.
[Ref. 551
Roosevelt's agreement to these terms with Stalin have
been harshly criticized as having upset "the whole historic
basis of American foreign policy in the Far East... by the
virtual invitation to Stalin to take over Japan's former
exclusive and dominant role in Manchuria." [Ref. 561 The
restoration to Russia of these rights and properties, with
recognition of her "pre-eminent interest" in Manchuria, it
has been said, was a contradiction of American policy since
John Hay's time. Even if there had been no such agreement,
however, it is likely that the Soviet Union would still have
declared war against Japan. What she might have done with
regard to Manchuria as well, however, is open to conjecture.
Ambassador Harriman warned the President and Secretary of
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State that without the agreement, Stalin might turn
Manchuria over to the Chinese Communists rather than the
Nationalist government after liberating it from the
Japanese. It is also possible that Roosevelt was using the
agreement to preempt any potential Soviet grab for territory
after the war had been concluded. [ Re f . 57] But whatever
the reason or combination of reasons for accepting Stalin's
terms, the president's conclusion that Russian assistance
could likely spare the lives of a million American soldiers,
and his decision to accept the stated cost of that
cooperation, was probably the most pragmatic, if not the
most controversial foreign policy decision of his career.
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VI
. CONTAINMENT AND BALANCE OF POWER -
PRAGMATISM IN AMERICA'S POSTWAR ASIAN POLICY
A. POSTWAR IDEALS
Immediately following World War II, American foreign
policy turned to the task of creating a regional environment
in East Asia which was the composite of ideals that had been
pursued by American statesmen from John Hay to Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Plans were made for the reorientation of Japan's
political and economic systems so that she could become a
peace-loving and prosperous contributor to regional and
global stability. In China, the opposing factions were to
be reconciled to form an effective coalition government,
enabling a strong, united and democratic China to take her
place as a major world power and guarantor of Asian
stability. Korea, as promised at Cairo, was to become free
and independent, "in due course," through national self-
determination. In Southeast Asia, the U.S. pressed forward
to insure the independence of the Philippines would be
carried out on schedule, and was prepared to encourage the
colonial powers in the region - Great Britain, France, and
the Netherlands - to grant independence to their colonies as
she had done with the Philippines.
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B. POSTWAR REALITIES
Events were taking place around the world, however,
which would have a significant impact on the attainment of
these goals. The American military machine which had been
responsible for creating the environment where these hopes
for transformation could be put to work, was undergoing the
most massive demobilization in the nation's history, while
America's security lines were being redrawn inward to
reflect the war-weary attitude of the people and a desire to
turn their attentions back to concerns that were more
strictly American. Both General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur and Secretary of State Dean Acheson would come
forward, in 1949 and 1950 respectively, to define America's
defensive perimeters as stopping west of a line running
through the Aleutian Islands, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and
the Philippines. Notably, this line omitted Formosa, to
where the Nationalist Chinese government had just retreated
after having been driven off the Chinese mainland by the
Communists, and Korea, where war was only months away.
Acheson went on to add that in a military attack in other
areas of the Pacific "the initial reliance must be on the
people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments
of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the
United Nations..." [ Re f . 581 The similarity between this
statement of policy and Richard Nixon's "Guam Doctrine" of
20 years later as It was used to facilitate a similar
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reduction of the U.S. military presence in Asia, is
unm istakeable .
Externally, the Soviet Union was exhibiting a renewed
vitality in its belligerent and expans ion i st ic behavior.
There was also the establishment of Communist-controlled
governments in Soviet-occupied Europe, Soviet support for
insurgency in Greece and elsewhere, pressures on Turkey and
Iran, the Berlin blockade in the winter of 1948-49,
detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb In August 1949,
Communist takeover in China the following October, and the
signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance
and Mutual Assistance in February 1950. All this added up
to a developing picture of a world in conflict, not the
post-war era of cooperation and peace Truman and his
administration had hoped for.
C. THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT
The failure of the western powers and the Soviet Union
to reach agreement on the four-power administration of
Germany at the Moscow Conference in 1947, was the
culmination of more than two years of unsuccessful efforts
to fulfill the wartime agreements of Cairo, Yalta and
Potsdam. As such, the conference marked a turning point in
relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and the beginning
of a new American policy to "contain" the Soviet Union and
other Communist states within their existing borders. The
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new policy relied on time and Internal strains, rather than
direct and immediate confrontation, to eventually sap the
strength of this new Soviet empire. [ Re f . 591
This policy of "containment," first articulated in
George Kennan's 1947 article, "The Sources of Soviet
Conduct", and later embodied in National Security Council
Memorandum 68, had political, military and economic aspects,
as well as a variety of specific objectives to achieve an
overall effect. There were four primary aspects of
containment which were implemented by the Truman
adm in istrat ion
.
1 . The Truman Doctrine
The Truman Doctrine was a general principle of
foreign policy direction and an integral part of the
containment policy. In articulating the "doctrine" the
President stated, "It must be the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."
Such support was provided early on to Greece and Turkey to
help defend them against Communist insurgency and Soviet
external pressures.
2. The Marshall Plan
The Marshall Plan provided economic aid for the
remainder of Europe. It was conceived from an assumption
that the best protection against the spread of Communism
throughout Western Europe was economic recovery. The plan
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enabled the United States to "contribute to world peace and
to its own security by assisting in the recovery of sixteen
countries* which, like the United States, are devoted to the
preservation of free institutions and enduring peace among





The Point Four program extended a similar kind of
aid to third world countries "for making the benefits of our
scientific advances and Industrial progress available for
the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas."
4 Collective Security
The fourth aspect of containment was collective
security, primarily the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). In East Asia, the containment policy was
implemented through a series of collective security
agreements, economic and military aid, and military force
deployments to the Asian nations which had been behind
America's security lines. The Philippine Treaty
(30 August 1951) and the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and
United States) Treaty (I September 1951) were initially
intended to serve as U.S. assurance against renewed Japanese
aggression, as well as induce those countries into signing
• The offer for assistance was made to all nations of
Europe, Communist and non-Communist alike, but was
rejected by the Soviet satellite states, as well as
Finland. Spain and Germany, which as yet had no
government, did not participate.
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the Allied Powers' peace treaty with Japan. The Japanese
Treaty (8 September 1951) to "deter armed attack on Japan,"
was, according to Secretary Acheson, a responsibility we
assumed with the defeat and disarmament of that nation, and
necessary "both in the interest of our security and, in all
honor, in the interest of Japanese security." t Re f . 60]
The security commitments made by America in Asia up to
that point, therefore, had a basis independent of both the
containment policy and the Korean War. The bilateral
security treaties with the Republic of Korea (1 October 1953)
and the Republic of China (20 December 1954), however,
clearly provided the very foundation for the containment of
Communism In Asia. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO, 8 September 1954) completed this framework by
bringing Thailand within the U.S. defense perimeter and
making South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia potential recipients
of U.S. defense assistance. Notably, one significant aspect
of the SEATO treaty was the appended protocol where the
United States explicitly stated its understanding that the
treaty provisions referring to "armed attack" applied only
to "communist aggression."
Unfortunately, the treaty itself, because of
ambiguities that it contained, diminished the effectiveness
of the policy of containment in the region. The treaty's
unique provisions for extending protection to non-member
parties to the agreement (i.e., South Vietnam, Laos and
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Cambodia), and the identification of internal (insurgent)
threats as within the scope of activities requiring a
reaction, clouded U.S. intentions, and reduced the treaty's
overall value as a deterrent. [Ref. 61]
D. REWRITING POSTWAR CHINA POLICY
In China, postwar cooperation between the Nationalist
and Communist forces deteriorated drastically following
Japan's defeat. Despite substantial efforts by the United
States at mediation, extremists on both sides prevented
compromise or cooperation, and the situation deteriorated
into a state of civil war. A report by General Albert C.
Wedemeyer who had been sent to investigate the situation in
the summer of 1947, concluded large scale "moral, advisory
and material support to China," including a military
advisory group of 10,000 personnel, would be needed to
assist the Nationalists if they were to make the necessary
reforms to their military establishment. Wedemeyer also
proposed a five-power trusteeship as the only possible
solution to preventing Manchuria from becoming a Soviet
satel 1 ite . [Ref. 621
But the scope of this required assistance was more tnan
the U.S. government was willing to provide. There were too
many other commitments for economic and military aid to
Europe, and confidence in Chiang Ka i Shek's ability to
govern, even with substantial American aid, was extremely
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low. As a result, the administration resolved not to become
directly involved in the Chinese civil war, and thus not to
assume any responsibility for the military or economic
underwriting of the Nationalist Chinese Government. [ Re f . 63]
The situation was left to run its course, ultimately
resulting in the defeat of the Nationalist forces and their
withdrawal to Formosa in December 1949.
The extent to which the U.S. had "washed its hands" of
the entire situation is illustrated by the fact that, by
early 1950, the administration had apparently reconciled
itself to a Communist takeover of Formosa as well as the
mainland. When congress proposed the U.S. occupy, or at
least defend the island, President Truman responded, on
5 January 1950, "that the United States had no Intention of
establishing bases on Formosa or of providing ^military aid
or advice' to the Chinese forces there." t Re f . 64]
These events in China further crystal ized America's
commitment to the application of the containment policy in
Asia. Secretary Acheson announced on 27 July 1949, when
Communist victory in China appeared imminent, that "the
United States does not intend to permit further extensions
of Communist domination on the continent of Asia or in the
Southeast Asian area." In directing a thorough review of
U.S. East Asian policy he stated further that he wanted the
review committee to be certain that "we are neglecting no
opportunities that would be within our capabilities to
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achieve the purpose of halting the spread of totalitarian
communism in Asia." [ Re f . 65]
The "loss" of China sparked widespread indignation in
the United States and highly vocal criticism in Congress of
the administration's conduct of foreign policy. This
reaction arose out of a frustration and inability to control
events in China, and to rescue a country seen by many as a
loyal and faithful ally of the last war. But more deeply,
it came from a perception of the complete failure - and
perhaps abandonment - of one of America's most basic policy
goals in the East Asia when it had seemed to have been so
close at hand only a few years before. That is, a strong,
democratic and independent China whose territorial and
administrative integrity were unencumbered; a China allied
with the United States and able to take its place among the
great powers of the world and to play a major role in the
affairs of Asia and the world. What made things all the
worse, however, was that the China which was emerging was
one we did not want - a China under Communist control.
In more pragmatic terms, the Communist victory
represented a tremendous shift in the Asian balance of
power. Less than five years after having concluded a world
war, one major effect of which had been to repair a power
imbalance upset by an expans ionist ic and militaristic Japan,
the United States found itself again faced with another
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Asian giant threatening regional security. China had now
become the primary target of the containment policy in Asia.
E. THE KOREAN WAR
Korea had been divided into Russian and American zones
for the purpose of accepting the surrender of Japanese
troops there after WWII. Once that task had been
accomplished, however, neither the Foreign Ministers nor the
military commanders of the occupying countries could come to
agreement on the type or composition of government to set up
for a united Korea. The U.S. referred the question to the
United Nations in 1947, and a special commission was set up
to oversee elections for a constitutional assembly. Blocked
from entering the Russian zone in the north, the commission
proceeded to carry out the elections only in the south,
where the Republic of Korea was inaugurated in August 1948.
The Soviets, in turn, installed in the north the government
of a Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Subsequently,
the Soviets, in 1948, and then the Americans, in 1949,
withdrew their occupation military forces from Korea. A
year later, on 25 June 1950, the north invaded the south.
Within a matter of hours after being notified of the
attack, President Truman requested a meeting of the UN
Security Council, which passed - due primarily to the
absence of the Soviet delegate - a resolution condemning the
attack. Two days later, on 27 June 1950, the Council passed
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another resolution recommending U.N. members "furnish such
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to
repel the armed attack and to restore international peace
and security in the area."
Truman responded quickly to the UN's requests, on
27 June ordering American naval and air forces to support the
South Korean government forces. On 30 June he authorized
the use of American ground troops as well. In his 27 June
announcement, the president stated that it was now evident
that "communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to
conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion
and war." A successful attack on Formosa by the Chinese
Communists under these circumstances would be a threat to
the security of the Pacific area, including United States
forces on duty there. He had, therefore, "ordered the
Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa," and had
called, as well, on the Nationalist forces on Formosa to
cease all attacks on the mainland to remove all excuse for
such an attack. He had also Instructed the Seventh Fleet to
"see that this is done." The president also noted that he
was accelerating military assistance to the Philippines and
Indochina, the scenes of other armed conflicts with
Communist forces." [Ref. 661
Five months later, after MacArthur and the United
Nations forces had turned the fighting around and pushed the
battle nearly to North Korea's border with China, Communist
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Chinese forces joined the fight. The supply lines for these
forces extended back well into Manchuria, but MacArthur was
under orders not to interdict them inside Chinese territory,
a restriction with which he strongly disagreed. So strong,
in fact, were his objections to the prohibition against
bombing what he called the "privileged sanctuary" of
Manchuria, that his public protests ultimately resulted in
h i s recal 1
.
At issue was the decision to limit the war to Korea
rather than taking the battle on into China in an attempt to
wipe out Communism in Asia once and for all. The risk, of
course, was that such an action might also draw the Soviet
Union into the conflict. While MacArthur argued "There is
no substitute for victory," Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman,
General of the Army Omar N. Bradley warned that a full-scale
war with China would be "the wrong war at the wrong place,
at the wrong time and with the wrong enemy."
It was MacArthur's belief that Asia was the decisive
theater in the struggle with communism and that the United
States should pursue the battle alone if necessary.
Certainly, President Truman would have liked nothing better
than to put an end to Chinese Communism, but in the best
pragmatist fashion, he realized the U.S. could not afford to
become involved in a major confrontation with another
nuclear power. The investment in Korea was not significant
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enough as to warrant the potentially disastrous consequences
of such a confrontation.
F. CHANGING JAPAN'S ROLE
The pacification process in Japan under the tutelage of
General MacArthur was taking place quickly and smoothly as
planned when two significant events occurred which caused a
change in the American concept for the Japanese role in
post-war East Asia. The Communist takeover of mainland
China and the Korean war completely scrapped the long held,
but idealistic notion that China should assume a leading
role in the affairs of Asia, while it accelerated the
process of negotiating a final peace treaty with Japan. The
cumulative effect of these was the most pragmatic
development of the post-war period, the decision to use
Japan, the defeated enemy, to replace China in the American
scheme for East Asia, and to build her up to serve as the
kingpin to overall Asian stability and security.
G. BEGINNINGS OF INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
In Northeast Asia the containment line that had been
expanded to include Korea and Formosa proved to be
relatively effective, primarily because of the geographic
characteristics of the territories it was intended to
protect. Both Japan and Taiwan are Island nations, and
therefore easily defensible, while South Korea Is a narrow-
walsted peninsula making the frontier short. Southeast
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Asia, on the other hand, is an entirely different situation.
There, neither terrain nor political conditions were suited
to a policy of deterrence through containment.
The French experienced considerable difficulty in
attempting to regain control over their colonial possessions
in Indochina after World War II. The Vietminh organization
was already well in control and unwilling to surrender power
to the returning French. Initial negotiations between the
two parties broke down by the end of 1946, and by 1949 the
fighting had turned into a full scale war.
Initially, the goal of U.S. foreign policy with regard
to Indochina had been to persuade France to give her
colonies their independence, just as the U.S. had done in
the Philippines. France, however, was intent on preserving
her empire and the economic benefits she could accrue from
It to facilitate post-war reconstruction. The U.S. was
also, at that time, courting a reluctant France In an effort
to put together the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In
order to cultivate its N.A.T.O. ally and to relieve some of
the pressures she was experiencing in Asia, the U.S. began
supplying money and equipment to the French-sponsored State
of Vietnam in its battle against the Vietminh.
The American decision to support France was another
classic example of foreign policy pragmatism. Efforts to
keep France in NATO where she could facilitate collective
security and containment in Europe, were clearly more
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Important to America's global interests than was working
against her French ally's stated interests by actively
supporting the ideal of independence for colonial
territories in Indochina.
What is more, as the Vietminh effort became more
closely identified with its communist cadre, it became in
itself, a suitable target for the containment policy.
Accordingly, it was not surprising when, in the wake of the
North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950, President
Truman selected Indochina and the Philippines, "the scenes
of other armed conflicts with Communist forces," to receive
additional support to aid them in their struggles.
H. DEEPENING INVOLVEMENT
Once the United States had redefined and expanded its
Asian security perimeter to support the requirements of
containment, it had to put its prestige on the line to
defend it. Maintaining the integrity of the perimeter,
overall, became just as vital as the safety of the nations
behind it. Moreover, all along the line, whether in Japan,
Korea or South Vietnam, individual segments came to be so
closely identified with the line as a whole, that any break
at all was seen as having potentially disastrous
consequences for the entire line. [Ref. 671 Like a chain
with one weak link, once that link Is broken, the chain is
no longer capable of fulfilling its function. This
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interpretation was subscribed to by each successive
president from Eisenhower to Nixon, even though the congress
grew increasingly skeptical.
With the evolution of strategic doctrine from "massive
retaliation" to "flexible response" came a requirement to
meet any challenge to American security commitments,
regardless of character, with a visible demonstration of
resolve. This was needed so as to preserve the
"credibility" of deterrence at greater levels of conflict.
Escalation of the American military involvement in Southeast
Asia, therefore, came in response to the requirements of
both containment and flexible response, the two fundamental
elements in the operation of national security policy.
I. NIXON AND KISSINGER: CHINA REGAINED
America's failure to recognize the deterioration of
Sino-Soviet relations during the 1950's and 1960's, and the
uncertainties of the Cultural Revolution in China, kept the
focus of the containment policy in Asia on the Peoples
Republic of China and delayed attempts to smooth relations
until the initiation of rapprochment by President Nixon in
1972. In the wake of groundwork laid during the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations, candidate Nixon, as early as
October 1967, began to build the foundations for later
proposals that would greatly alter American policy toward
China and the policy of containment as well.
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The approach to foreign policy taken by President Nixon
and his National Security Advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, was
thoroughly pragmatic, especially as it pertains to the bold
initiatives that were undertaken in U.S. relations with
Asia. In the first six months of his administration, Nixon
ordered a re-examination of U.S. policy toward China,
announced the beginning of American troop withdrawal from
Vietnam, and promulgated his "Guam" Doctrine. This broad
sweep of activity signaled an almost complete reversal of
previous tactics in the implementation of Asian policy.
More notably, it reflected an acknowledgement of the
tremendous loss of public support for military involvement
on the Asia mainland, as well as a recognition of the
enormous costs that would be involved in resolving the
Vietnam conflict by convential military means.
In his first inaugural address, Nixon spoke of a new
era of negotiation and a reduced American role in a non-
polar world. Accordingly, the Nixon Doctrine, as it came to
be called after its formal announcement in 1971, stated that
the U.S. would reduce its military presence on the Asian
mainland, but would still provide friendly Asian nations
with the military and economic support to defend themselves
against aggression if so requested. Two initial effects of
the new policy were an Increase in the pace of
"V ie tnam izat ion" , the assumption of American combat
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responsibilities by Vietnamese forces, and the withdrawal of
one of the two U.S. ground force divisions then stationed in
Korea
.
While the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine and the
president's subsequent trip to China gave substance to the
ending of the containment policy as applied to China, they
stirred widespread concern among America's Asian allies who
were faced with having to take a closer look at U.S.
capabilities to assist in their defense. President Marcos
of the Philippines summed up their concerns when he stated
on 19 July 1971 that "I am certain that this alteration and
change in the policy of the U.S. will mean that every Asian
nation and leader must review the basis for all agreements
between the U.S. and their respective countries." [Ref. 681
Normalization of relations with the Peoples Republic of
China changed the character of containment in Asia, but it
did not eliminate it. With relations between the U.S. and
P.R.C. on the mend - Nixon had agreed to open diplomatic
relations during his second term, but was short-circuited by
Watergate - the Soviet presence In the Far East became the
focal point for containment in Asia, while American
strategists looked once again to China to take a place in a
revised American security perimeter. The ant 1 -hegemony
clause of the Shanghai Communique could not have matched




J. PRAGMATISM IN THE CARTER AND REAGAN PRESIDENCIES
The search for pragmatism was clearly evidenced in the
administrations of Presidents Carter and Reagan. Both
presidents were acutely aware of the ongoing contradictions
between morality and realism, but they approached the problem of
compromise from distinctly different points of view.
President Carter was obsessed with the morality issue. He
was intensely committed to human rights, yet he had to contend
with the reality of the Soviet threat. He said:
I was familiar with the arguments that we had to choose
between idealism and realism, between morality and the
exertion of power; but I rejected those claims. To me
the demonstration of American idealism was a practical
and realistic approach to foreign affairs, and moral
principles were the best foundation for the exertion of
American power and influence.
His National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski,
expressed the Carter philosophy somewhat differently:
It is not a popular thing to remind people that power
is important, that it has to be applied, that sometimes
decisions which are not fully compatible with our
concepts of what the world ideally ought to be like
need to be taken. [Ref. 69]
Not surprisingly, the foreign policy record of President
Carter was a mixed bag of success and failure, of achievement and
f rustrat ion
.
It is too soon to anticipate the judgement of history on the
Carter administration. His penchant was to favor those who
shared his philosophy, but he did not hesitate to take actions in
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the name of pragmatism when expedient in the national interest.
Human rights issues provided the standard against which President
Carter measured his relationships in foreign policy. A
satisfactory record in the area of human rights was a
prerequisite for a substantial request for American economic or
military assistance, while a poor record made assistance
difficult. Exceptions were grudgingly granted.
The process of normalizing relations with China was carried
through to its logical conclusion when the United States
officially established diplomatic relations in January 1979.
This was a pragmatic procedure which President Carter hoped would
move China to improve its human rights situation. This was not a
startling Carter coup, since the groundwork had been completed
earlier by President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger. The key to
this development was the pragmatism in U.S. policy. Regardless
of the morality involved, a solid diplomatic relationship with
the most populous nation on earth seemed highly advisable.
The recognition of China was an Important step in our
evolving relations with the nations of Asia. With normalcy in
dealing with China, the United States gained a high-powered,
though in many ways constrained, supporter for many of its vital
foreign policy goals. China was encouraged to act responsibly in
world affairs, and more importantly was changed from a confirmed
adversary to a potential collaborator. In a military sense as
well, the recognition of China succeeded in reducing pressure on
92
U.S. forces in the Asia and Pacific region, allowing a percentage
of both American and Chinese forces to be reoriented toward the
Soviet Union instead of each other. For the Chinese, the
reduction of the American threat gave them the increased
flexibility needed in dealing with the Soviets and reduced
the immediate pressures to seek accomodation with Moscow.
Improved relations with mainland China meant that priorities
relating to Taiwan would have to be rearranged so far as American
national interests were concerned. Relations between the United
States and Taiwan were limited to economic and cultural ties.
Yet there was still a very strong commitment to a peaceful
resolution of the differences between Beijing and Taipei (which
differed little from the American basic interest which opposes
the forceful takeover of any friendly nation by another). The
continuing Importance of such a peaceful settlement was
underscored by its inclusion in both the 1972 Shanghai Communique
and the January 1979 announcement of the establishment of normal
relations. The 1979 statement said:
The United States is confident the people of Taiwan
face a peaceful and prosperous future. The United
States continues to have an interest in the peaceful
resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the
Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese
themsel ves .
With regard to the Republic of Korea, Carter was torn
between his own desire to increase pressure for improved human
rights and his hope to withdraw some of the troops stationed on
the Korean peninsula. The desire to withdraw the troops,
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however, was by no means tantamount to suggesting that he was
willing to abandon Korea or Northeast Asia as was charged by his
critics in Korea, Japan and in the United States itself.
Ultimately, the troop withdrawal initiative proved unpopular
and unworkable. Carter was unable to reconcile his own vision
for Korea with the Korean demand that the Americans remain in
place. His original intent to withdraw a portion of U.S. ground
troops had strong moralist overtones which were byproducts of his
human rights concerns. But the plan was hastily conceived and
opposed more vigorously and from more quarters than the president:
had anticipated, ultimately bringing about his change in course.
Pragmatism tipped the scales in favor of continuing the status
quo for the maintenance of security for the 40 million citizens
of Korea.
President Carter confronted the same policy dilemma in
dealing with Marcos in the Philippines. Carter hated the
inhumanity of martial law and he bristled against Marcos' abuses
of democracy. Yet he could not turn his back on Marcos because
of the need of the United States for the use of Clark Air Base,
Sublc Bay and other American facilities on Philippine soil. He
temporized, resorting to criticisms and grudging extensions of
American aid, but he also negotiated a new agreement for the use
of the military bases. It was left for President Reagan to "bite
the bullet" - to cooperate In the overthrow of Marcos and to
assist President Aquino in the restoration of democracy.
In achieving foreign policies that were desirable from a
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pragmatic standpoint, President Reagan was not inhibited by
considerations of human rights. To him, morality was identified
with "democracy" or "ant icommun i sm" . He was determined to stress
power as the guarantor of security and he was reluctant to accept
any measure or compromise which threatened to take any edge off
American power.
For as long as President Carter was in office, his
difficulties never extinguished his hopes for detente based upon
an improved situation for human rights domestically within the
Soviet Union. He was never successful in persuading the majority
of American citizens to share his faith in peaceful coexistance.
Most Americans were distrustful of the Soviets and felt no
confidence in any Soviet statements of good intentions.
Furthermore, Brezhnev was no Gorbachev. The challenge of the
Soviets in the Middle East, the suspicion of Soviet motives
there, and the invasion of Afghanistan together with the crowning
indignity of the American hostages in Iran helped to propel
Carter out of office at the end of his first term.
President Reagan's victory at the polls was largely due to
his outspoken, uncompromising stand against the Soviet Union. It
was abundantly clear that in his search for a pragmatic foreign
policy, he would distance himself from the morality of Carter and
lean more heavily toward the side of confrontation and reliance
upon military strength.
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Ronald Reagan entered the White House armed, as he saw
it, with a mandate from the American people to restore the
country to the position of prominance in world affairs from
which it had slipped during the Carter administration. The
approach was straightforward.
The Reagan administration clearly viewed the Soviet
Union as the main source of challenge to America's foreign
policy interests, both globally and regionally in East Asia.
Speaking on American foreign policy priorities before the
Los Angeles World Affairs Council on 24 April 1981, Walter
J. Stoessel, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, prefaced his remarks with what he termed the four
basic elements of the Reagan administration's overall
foreign policy approach. Two of these four dealt with
meeting challenges from the Soviet Union, one with
restoration of the domestic economy, and the fourth concerned
Itself with matters of procedures In negotiating with the
communists. The following paragraphs summarize the Reagan -
Stoessel philosophy:
We must strengthen our military posture in order to
compensate for the tremendous buildup of Soviet
military power which has been going on for the past two
decades. We must keep in mind the saying that "defense




(W)e are concerned in a very basic way by the worldwide
pattern of Soviet adventurism. We seek a greater
degree of moderation and restraint as well as
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commitment to abide by international law in Soviet
behavior, but only the evident strength of our nation
and of our friends and allies will serve the quest for
stability with the Soviet Union.
Turning to specific American interests in Asia, Mr. Stoessel added,
In recent years, we have recognized that our Asia
security policy is related to our larger task of coping
with the strategic challenge posed by our principal
adversary, the Soviet Union, and by the aggressive
actions of nations which receive its backing and act as
its proxies, such as Vietnam. The challenge is global
in character, and what we do in Asia will be consistent
with our efforts elsewhere. C Re f . 701
The record of the Reagan administration carried out its
original promise. Thanks to his supporters in the Congress and
the Department of Defense, he built up the American military
establishment to unprecedented heights. He closed the window of
vulnerability and convinced the world of American capability of
deterring Soviet aggression. He was no friend of international
agreement on arms control or limitation of armaments. He was too
distrustful of any agreement with the "evil empire". Tending to
believe that any compromise was an indication of weakness, he was
tough in negotiations. It was ironic that at the end of his
second term it appeared that the high water mark of his
administration would be an arms control agreement which he had so
fervently and consistently opposed. This was perhaps the supreme
example of his ability to bow to pragmatism no matter how much it
went against his dedication to realism.
President Reagan's global policies reflected his consuming
ant i -commun ism, ant i -Sov ie
t
ism and his passionate, professed
absorbtlon in the cause of universal freedom and democracy. He
97
often said that he was as dedicated to human rights as his
predecessor, but he differed in his priorities. Reagan preferre
to resort to quiet diplomacy to support human rights and to be
outspoken for freedom. Carter saw human rights as the very
essence of freedom. Reagan's rhetoric of defiance spanned the
world. It explained his policies in Lebanon (where the Marines
died); in Grenada, which he invaded; and in Nicaragua, where he
staked his reputation on aid to the Contras. It baffled him in
trying to obtain the release of the hostages In the Middle East
He was warm In his attitudes toward conservative and staunch
ant i -commun i st rulers in the rest of the world. He was at one
with Margaret Thatcher, Yasu Nakasone, Ferdinand Marcos and Chun
Doo Hwan. He hated communist rulers like Castro and was
Intolerant of neutrals. He could not but be skeptical of smiling-
communists like Deng Xiaoping. Any deal with a communist nation
was a matter of expediency, not of choice.
But even President Reagan had to seek the pragmatic norm In
dealing with other nations, in spite of his fierce commitment to
the ideology of freedom and democracy. It was difficult for him
to desert Marcos, whose anti-communism far outweighed his
multitude of sins. It was impossible to take Gorbachev at face
value. It was galling to have to make choices in conflicts
between friendly nations, as between Argentina and Great Britain
in the dispute over the Falkland Islands. It irritated him when
allies differed with him on relations with communist nations -
for example, the European community and the Soviet pipeline, or
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on such military matters as the Japanese share In security costs
or the New Zealand pronouncement on the vists of nuclear-powered,
nuclear-armed ships. It was not easy to take a stand on one side
or the other of an international dispute in which the eleme:.. of
communism or freedom was not the crucial variant.
The Reagan administration faced a multitude of problems in
the growing dilemma between security cooperation and economic
competition. The American collective defense system in the Asia-
Pacific region was subjected to increasing strains due to the
spectacular economic growth of Japan, Korea and the newly
industrialized countries of Southeast Asia. The huge deficits in
the U.S. budget and the International Income account made
Americans feel that their allies should bear a larger share of
the costs of security. The Americans were no longer as supreme
economically as they were at the end of World War II, and
apparently they had lost alot of the competitive edge in
manufacturing and trade which they had long enjoyed. Americans
in the Congress demanded some sort of protection - either tariff
legislation or retaliatory measures against such unfair practices
as dumping or discriminating against American imports. At heart
a free trader and staunchly against higher taxes, Reagan resisted
legislative measures that he thought would work against the
effectiveness of his Asia-Pacific security arrangements.
Reality forced President Reagan to tilt toward the demands
of those American interests which wanted special protection. He
bent, without giving In, but he left to his successors a dilemma
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that became one of the leading issues of the election of 1988.
Reagan wanted the government to stay out of the rivalry between
private interests in international trade, but he could not ignore'
the pressures of public opinion.
President Reagan, like all his predecessors, learned that
neither power nor morality can be the sole guide to the
determination of the American national interest. Sometimes the
one line of policy needs to be emphasized, sometimes the other.
Hard as it might be, the pursuit of policy cannot be confined to
a single line nor a single set of alternatives. The one element
of consistency in the execution of foreign policy is that
sometimes ideals must be pushed aside, tactics modified, and
convictions relaxed for the sake of finding a pragmatic solution
to a diplomatic problem.
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VII . CONCLUSION
The process by which American foreign policy is
determined is a dynamic one. World conditions are in
constant change while centers of policy influence rise and
fall in importance in tandom with the nation's political
cycles. Elected and appointed policymakers come and go,
bringing with them visions of world order, varying levels of
understanding or personal interest in foreign affairs, and
plans of action in pursuit of a variety of personal goals
and objectives. The mood of the public, media influence,
and general tone of the times also have shares in this
process which ultimately determines our foreign policy and
how the United States will interact with the other nations
of the world.
Foreign policy makers thus have much to contend with in
their efforts to formulate rational policies to manage the
nation's external affairs, policies which sometimes fall
short of their intended purpose. In particular, the
idealists among them - the John Hays, Woodrow Wilsons and
Jimmy Carters - have had to discover that compromise and
negotiation are as much the keys to success In foreign
policy as they are in domestic party politics. That is not
to say, however, that there is no place for idealism in the
practice and policy of foreign affairs. On the contrary,
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Ideals are a proven source of direction and provide a
standard against which progress can be measured.
On the other hand, the pragmatic approach to foreign
affairs, or dealing with circumstances as they really are
and not how we would like them to be, is the real guarantor
of a successful foreign policy. Without exception, all
senior policymakers have had to rely on this approach,
regardless of their rhetoric or political platforms.
Ultimately what has separated the idealists from the
pragmatists has been only the degree to which they resorted
to pragmatic alternatives.
There have been blatant pragmatists like Theodore
Roosevelt and Henry Kissinger, who conducted foreign policy
with the studied calculations of an accountant maintaining
his books. But there have also been subtle pragmatists.
Idealists such as Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter who clung
to "just and moral" causes until the cost of their pursuit
jeopardized other, more vital national interests. Woodrow
Wilson's personal commitment to the League of Nations and
Jimmy Carter's "moral" foreign policy stand out as two good
examples. Yet both had solid records of having taken
pragmatic actions as "means" to greater "ends." At the
Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Wilson had accepted Japanese
claims to Chinese territories, despite his initial strong
opposition, rather than alienate the Japanese from the
negotiating process and possibly undermine their ultimate
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membership in the League of Nations. In the Carter case,
not going through with the 1977 decision to withdraw
American troops from Korea proved to be the pragmatic
solution to an initially bad policy overweighted by the
moral issue of human rights.
In summary, while the foreign policy pragmatism of
Roosevelt, Nixon and Kissinger may have been more blatant
than most, every leader who ever developed American foreign
policy, whether they were basically a realist or an
idealist, had to be a pragmatist in the end. Whatever their
own particular conviction about the nature of the national
interest, each lived up to their oath to support and promote
that interest, and gave their all to the accomplishment of
national objectives as they perceived them.
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